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Brexit agus an gá le hainmniú speisialta do Thuaisceart Éireann.
BREXIT AND THE NEED FOR A SPECIAL DESIGNATION FOR NORTHERN IRELAND.
Brexit agus an gá le hainmniú speisialta do Thuaisceart Éireann.
BREXIT AND THE NEED FOR A SPECIAL DESIGNATION FOR NORTHERN IRELAND.
DRÉACHT-ORDUITHE TAGARTHA DO CHOISTE BREXIT AN TSEANAIDD’AINNEOIN AON NÍ SNA BUAN-ORDUITHE—(1)
DRAFT ORDERS OF REFERENCE FOR SEANAD BREXIT COMMITTEE THAT , notwithstanding anything in Standing Orders -(1)
maidir le dréacht-treoirlínte na Comhairle Eorpaí (Airteagal 50) le haghaidh caibidlíochtaí Brexit.
RE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (ARTICLE 50) DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR BREXIT NEGOTIATIONS.
Ráitis maidir le Brexit
STATEMENTS ON BREXIT.
Na hImpleachtaí atá ag Brexit do Chomhaontú Aoine an Chéasta: Príomhchinnt
THE IMPLICATIONS OF BREXIT FOR THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT: KEY FINDINGS
—Aire aonair Brexit a bhunú ag leibhéal Comh-Aireachta ar a mbeidh an cúram freagra uile-Rialtais ar dhúshlán Brexit a stiúradh;
—TO ESTABLISH A SINGLE MINISTER FOR BREXIT AT CABINET LEVEL TASKED WITH LEADING A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE OF BREXIT;
lena mbunaítear an Cúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit
establishing the Brexit Adjustment Reserve
Bunaítear an Cúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit (“an Cúlchiste”) leis an Rialachán seo.
This Regulation establishes the Brexit Adjustment Reserve (the ‘Reserve’).
Cúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit
Brexit Adjustment Reserve (BAR)
Cúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit
Brexit Adjustment Reserve (BAR)
Cúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit
Brexit Adjustment Reserve (BAR)
An tSaoráid Téarnaimh agus Athléimneachta - Ranníocaíocht ó Chúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit
Recovery and Resilience Facility - Contribution from the BAR
Bhí tionchar ag ualach rialála méadaithe ar 54 % de ghnólachtaí mar gheall ar Brexit ().
54% of firms had been impacted by an increased regulatory burden due to Brexit ().
aistrithe deonacha ón gCúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit.
voluntary transfers from the Brexit Adjustment Reserve.
—go ndéanfadh crua-Brexit sláine agus stádas institúideach, bunreachtúil agus dlíthiúil Chomhaontú Aoine an Chéasta a lagú; agus
—A HARD BREXIT WOULD UNDERMINE THE INSTITUTIONAL, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND LEGAL INTEGRITY AND STATUS OF THE GFA; AND
An Coiste um Ealaíona, Oidhreacht, Gnóthaí Réigiúnacha, Tuaithe agus Gaeltachta chun díriú ar thionchar Brexit ar phobail na teorann
HOUSES OF THE OIREACHTAS MEDIA RELEASE COMMITTEE ON ARTS, HERITAGE, REGIONAL, RURAL & GAELTACHT AFFAIRS TO FOCUS ON IMPACT OF BREXIT ON BORDER COMMUNITIES
Na himpleachtaí atá ag Brexit do Comhaontú Aoine an Chéasta: na Príomhchinntí. Meitheamh, 2017.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF BREXIT FOR THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT: KEY FINDINGS. JUNE, 2017.
An Tionchar Eacnamaíoch Dóchúil a bheidh ag Brexit agus Béim ar Leith ar Phoist agus Fiontair. (Márta 2017).
THE LIKELY ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BREXIT WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON JOBS AND ENTERPRISE. (MARCH, 2017).
—go bhféadfadh gurb amhlaidh má leantar le crua-Brexit a shaothrú go bhforchuirfí leasú ar an Northern Ireland Act, 1998 a thugann inniúlacht agus údarás reachtach do Chomhaontú Aoine an Chéasta;
—THE PURSUIT OF A HARD BREXIT MAY WELL IMPOSE THE AMENDMENT OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND ACT 1998, WHICH GIVES LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE AND AUTHORITY TO THE GFA;
Ar an gcéad dul síos, mhaígh siad go bhfuil deacrachtaí ag táirgeoirí an Aontais cainníochtaí leordhóthanacha ECCS a áirithiú, go háirithe tar éis Brexit a d’eisiadh Tata Cruach ó thionscal an Aontais.
First, they claimed that the Union producers have difficulties to ensure sufficient quantities of ECCS, especially after Brexit that excluded Tata Steel from the Union industry.
Áirítear ar na tosca sin straitéis táirgthe thionscal an Aontais agus a costais, forbairt ar éileamh ar shileacan, méadú ar allmhairí tríú tíortha agus tionchar Brexit.
Those factors include the production strategy of the Union industry and its costs, development in the silicon demand, increase in third country imports and the impact of Brexit.
Cé go bhfuil seans maith ann go bhfulaingeoidh geilleagar na hÉireann suaití atá dírithe ar an taobh amuigh, léirigh sé athléimneacht shuntasach i bhfianaise dhúshlán dúbailte ghéarchéim na paindéime agus Brexit.
While the Irish economy is relatively prone to suffering externally-driven shocks, it showed remarkable resilience in the face of the double challenge of the pandemic crisis and Brexit.
Ag féachaint do Rialachán (AE) 2021/1755 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle an 6 Deireadh Fómhair 2021 lena mbunaítear an Cúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit, agus go háirithe Airteagal 4(5) de,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2021 establishing the Brexit Adjustment Reserve, and in particular Article 4(5) thereof,
Chuir 23 Bhallstát iarraidh réasúnaithe isteach chun méid iomlán EUR 2089446003 a aistriú ó Chúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit chuig an tSaoráid Téarnaimh agus Athléimneachta.
Twenty three Member States have submitted a reasoned request to transfer a total amount of EUR 2089446003 from the Brexit Adjustment Reserve to the Recovery and Resilience Facility.
Ba cheart an fhéidearthacht a bheith ag na Ballstáit lena mbaineann, a leithdháileadh sealadach iomlán nó cuid dá leithdháileadh sealadach a aistriú ó acmhainní an Chúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit chuig an tSaoráid.
Member States should have the possibility to transfer all or part of their provisional allocation from the resources of the Brexit Adjustment Reserve to the Facility.
Ar deireadh, déantar gealltanais agus leithreasuithe faoi chomhair íocaíochtaí faoin gCúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit agus faoin tSaoráid araon a iontráil de bhreis ar uasteorainneacha an chreata airgeadais ilbhliantúil.
Finally, commitments and payment appropriations under both the Brexit Adjustment Reserve and the Facility are entered over and above the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework.
Beidh na Ballstáit in ann deontais Chúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit (EUR 5.4 billiún) a thiomnú do na cuspóirí sin freisin.
Member States will also be able to dedicate grants of the Brexit Adjustment Reserve (EUR 5.4 billion) to these objectives.
Is é meastóireacht an tionscail agraibhia ann féin é gurb é GBP 60 milliún an costas rómhaorlathais a bhaineann le Brexit
The agri-food industry alone evaluated the cost of Brexit-related red tape at GBP 60 million.
Tar éis Brexit, ní Ballstát den Aontas í an Ríocht Aontaithe a thuilleadh ach is tríú tír í a bhfuil socruithe idirthréimhseacha ann dá heintitis
Following Brexit, UK is not longer a Member State but a third country for whose entities there are transitional arrangements
—gur beag an cúnamh dó stádas speisialta lasmuigh d’AE a bheith ag Tuaisceart Éireann agus aghaidh á thabhairt aige ar na dúshláin mhóra pholaitiúla, shóisialta agus eacnamaíocha a éireoidh as Brexit; a mheasúnú:
—A SPECIAL STATUS RELATIONSHIP FOR NORTHERN IRELAND OUTSIDE OF THE EU WOULD DO LITTLE TO DEAL WITH THE MASSIVE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES THROWN UP BY BREXIT; CONCLUDES THAT:
Dúirt Cathaoirleach an Choiste, Peadar Tóibín: Amárach, tionólfaidh an Comhchoiste um Ealaíona, Oidhreacht, Gnóthaí Réigiúnacha, Tuaithe agus Gaeltachta an chéad cheann de thrí chruinniú a bheidh aige chun an fhorbairt phobail, shóisialta agus eacnamaíoch agus an comhar i gcontaetha na teorann sa todhchaí i bhfianaise Brexit a phlé.
CATHAOIRLEACH OF THE COMMITTEE PEADAR TÓIBÍN SAID: TOMORROW, THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ARTS, HERITAGE, REGIONAL, RURAL AND GAELTACHT AFFAIRS WILL HOLD THE FIRST OF THREE MEETINGS TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF COMMUNITY, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION IN BORDER COUNTIES IN LIGHT OF BREXIT.
—soiléiriú a thabhairt ar an tionchar a bheidh ag Brexit ar an margadh árachais mótair in Éirinn, lena n-áirítear an tsaincheist maidir leis an Ríocht Aontaithe agus Giobráltar do bhaint leas as ‘pascheadú’.
—CLARIFY THE IMPACT BREXIT WILL HAVE ON THE MOTOR INSURANCE MARKET IN IRELAND, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF ‘PASSPORTING’ IN FROM THE UK AND GIBRALTAR.
—ábhair imní a chur in iúl ag leibhéal AE maidir le ‘siopadóireacht rialála’ ag gnólachtaí seirbhísí airgeadais atá bunaithe sa Ríocht Aontaithe (RA) agus iad ag iarraidh rochtain ar an Aontas Eorpach a chaomhnú i ndiaidh Brexit;
—RAISE CONCERNS AT EU LEVEL ABOUT ‘REGULATORY SHOPPING’ BY UNITED KINGDOM (UK) BASED FINANCIAL SERVICES FIRMS SEEKING TO PRESERVE ACCESS TO THE EU FOLLOWING BREXIT;
Go mbreithneoidh Seanad Éireann an Tuarascáil ó Roghchoiste Speisialta an tSeanaid um an Ríocht Aontaithe do Tharraingt Siar as an Aontas Eorpach ‘Brexit: Impleachtaí agus Réitigh Ionchasacha’, ar leagadh cóipeanna di faoi bhráid Sheanad Éireann an 30 Meitheamh, 2017.
THAT SEANAD ÉIREANN SHALL CONSIDER THE REPORT OF THE SEANAD SPECIAL SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION ENTITLED ‘BREXIT: IMPLICATIONS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS’, COPIES OF WHICH WERE LAID BEFORE SEANAD ÉIREANN ON 30TH JUNE, 2017.
—gur shoiléirigh Rialtas na Breataine faoi seo go ndéanfaidh said Airteagal 50 de Chonradh Liospóin a thionscnamh faoi dheireadh Mhárta 2017, agus tús a chur leis an bpróiseas imeachta, agus iarrfaidh said imeacht ón margadh aonair le crua-Brexit mar a thugtar air; agus
—THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS NOW MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WILL TRIGGER ARTICLE 50 OF THE LISBON TREATY BY THE END OF MARCH 2017, AND BEGIN THE EXIT PROCESS, AND WILL ALSO BE SEEKING TO LEAVE THE SINGLE MARKET IN A SO-CALLED HARD BREXIT; AND
Tá na pobail i réigiún na teorann ag brath ar a chéile chun leanúint ar aghaidh ag fás ó thaobh geilleagair de agus, dá ndéanfaí teorainn chrua a fhorchur tar éis Brexit, bheadh fíor-dhrochthionchar aige sin ar fhás eacnamaíoch agus comhtháthú leanúnach na bpobal sin.
THE COMMUNITIES IN THE BORDER REGION ARE DEPENDENT ON EACH OTHER FOR THEIR CONTINUED ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE POTENTIAL IMPOSITION OF A HARD BORDER FOLLOWING BREXIT WOULD HAVE A SERIOUS DETRIMENTAL IMPACT ON THEIR CONTINUED ECONOMIC GROWTH AND COHESION.
—tuarascáil a thabhairt do Thithe an Oireachtais, ar bhonn ráithiúil, maidir le forbairtí sna caibidlíochtaí Brexit mar aon le hanailís shonrach earnála a chuirfidh bonn eolais faoi dhíospóireacht phoiblí agus a chinnteoidh go mbeidh fíorchuntasacht ann.
—TO REPORT TO THE HOUSES OF THE OIREACHTAS, ON A QUARTERLY BASIS, REGARDING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BREXIT NEGOTIATIONS WITH A SPECIFIC SECTORAL ANALYSIS TO INFORM PUBLIC DEBATE AND ENSURE GENUINE ACCOUNTABILITY.
—forais Thuaidh-Theas agus na Breataine-na hÉireann a athbhreithniú agus a athleasú lena chinntiú go mbeidh sé ar a gcumas aghaidh a thabhairt ar na dúshláin agus na deiseanna a éiríonn as Brexit;
—TO REVIEW AND REFORM NORTH-SOUTH AND BRITISH-IRISH INSTITUTIONS TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE FIT FOR PURPOSE IN ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES POSED BY BREXIT;
a chreidiúint, mar aon leis an gCiste Airgeadaíochta Idirnáisiúnta, le Comhdháil na gCeardchumann agus le Cónaidhm Ghnólachtaí agus Fhostóirí na hÉireann, go bhfuil i bhfad níos mó infheistíochta caipitil ag teastáil ná an €2.65 billiún a shamhlaítear sa Phlean Caipitil, d’fhonn dul i ngleic le baic ar bhonneagar, infheistíocht easnamhach a rinneadh san am atá caite a chúiteamh, déileáil leis an bhfás mear laistigh den gheilleagar baile, déileáil le daonra atá ag méadú agus ag dul in aois, chomh maith le dul i ngleic leis na dúshláin ar leith a éiríonn as Brexit;
TOGETHER WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE IRISH CONGRESS OF TRADE UNIONS AND THE IRISH BUSINESS AND EMPLOYERS CONFEDERATION BELIEVES THAT, IN ORDER TO TACKLE INFRASTRUCTURAL BOTTLENECKS, MAKE UP FOR HISTORICAL UNDERINVESTMENT, DEAL WITH THE RAPID GROWTH WITHIN THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY, DEAL WITH A GROWING AND AGEING POPULATION, AS WELL AS TACKLE THE PARTICULAR CHALLENGES POSED BY BREXIT, MUCH GREATER CAPITAL INVESTMENT IS REQUIRED THAN THE €2.65 BILLION ENVISAGED IN THE CAPITAL PLAN;
Is deacair é sin a chreidiúint i gcás dearcadh na cuideachta féin a sonraíodh “is maith a bhí a fhios againn go raibh Brexit agus tarraingt siar deiridh na Ríochta Aontaithe curtha i gcrích an 1 Eanáir 2021”.
This is difficult to reconcile with the company’s own stated view that ‘it was well known that Brexit and final withdrawal of the UK was to take place on 1 January 2021’.
Chun an breisluach is fearr a fháil ó infheistíochtaí a mhaoinítear go hiomlán nó i bpáirt ó bhuiséad an Aontais, ba cheart sineirgí a lorg go háirithe idir na Cistí agus ionstraimí ábhartha eile, lena n-áirítear an tSaoráid Téarnaimh agus Athléimneachta agus Cúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit.
In order to optimise the added value from investments funded wholly or in part through the budget of the Union, synergies should be sought in particular between the Funds and other relevant instruments, including the Recovery and Resilience Facility and the Brexit Adjustment Reserve.
Ba cheart Cúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit (an “Cúlchiste”) a bhunú d’fhonn tacaíocht a sholáthar chun iarmhairtí díobhálacha tharraingt siar na Ríochta Aontaithe as an Aontas sna Ballstáit agus ar fud réigiún agus earnálacha a chomhrac, go háirithe sna cinn is mó atá buailte ag an tarraingt siar, agus, ar an gcaoi sin, an tionchar diúltach gaolmhar ar an gcomhtháthú eacnamaíoch, sóisialta agus críochach a mhaolú.
A Brexit Adjustment Reserve (the ‘Reserve’) should be established to provide support to counter the adverse consequences of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Union in Member States, regions and sectors, in particular in those that are worst affected by the withdrawal, and thus to mitigate the related negative impact on economic, social and territorial cohesion.
Rialachán (AE) 2021/1755 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle an 6 Deireadh Fómhair 2021 lena mbunaítear an Cúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit (IO L 357, 8.10.2021, p. 1).
Regulation (EU) 2021/1755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2021 establishing the Brexit Adjustment Reserve (OJ L 357, 8.10.2021, p. 1).
Tá an chaibidil seo beartaithe chun leithreasuithe a iontráil a leanann as slógadh Chiste Dlúthpháirtíochta an Aontais Eorpaigh, an Chiste Eorpaigh um Choigeartú don Domhandú d’Oibrithe Iomarcacha agus Chúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit, arb ionstraimí speisialta iad uile dá bhforáiltear i Rialachán (AE, Euratom) 2020/2093.
This chapter is intended to enter appropriations resulting from the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund, the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers and the Brexit Adjustment Reserve, all special instruments foreseen in Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093.
Tá an t-airteagal seo beartaithe chun leithreasuithe a iontráil a leanann as slógadh Chúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit chun cur i gcoinne iarmhairtí díobhálacha gan choinne sna Ballstáit agus sna hearnálacha is mó atá buailte ag tarraingt siar na Ríochta Aontaithe as an Aontas i gcomhréir le Rialachán (AE) 2021/1755.
This article is intended to enter appropriations resulting from the mobilisation of the Brexit Adjustment Reserve (BAR) to counter unforeseen and adverse consequences in Member States and sectors that are worst affected by the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Union in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/1755.
Rialachán (AE) 2021/1755 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle an 6 Deireadh Fómhair 2021 lena mbunaítear an Cúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit (IO L 357, 8.10.2021, lch. 1).
Regulation (EU) 2021/1755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2021 establishing the Brexit Adjustment Reserve (OJ L 357, 8.10.2021, p. 1).
Is é is aidhm don chúlchiste seo Cúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit a chumhdach a fhéadfar a úsáid chun cur in aghaidh iarmhairtí díobhálacha gan choinne sna Ballstáit agus sna hearnálacha is mó atá thíos de dheasca tharraingt siar na Ríochta Aontaithe as an Aontas.
The aim of this reserve is to cover the Brexit Adjustment Reserve (BAR) that may be used to counter unforeseen and adverse consequences in Member States and sectors that are worst affected by the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Union.
Rialachán (AE) 2021/1755 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle an 6 Deireadh Fómhair 2021 lena mbunaítear an Cúlchiste Coigeartaithe Brexit (IO L 357, 8.10.2021, lch. 1).
Regulation (EU) 2021/1755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2021 establishing the Brexit Adjustment Reserve (OJ L 357, 8.10.2021, p. 1).
Mar thaca leis an gcás dóchúil sin, tá an fhianaise a thug an t-iarratasóir maidir le caillteanas suntasach díolachán agus sciar den mhargadh sa Ríocht Aontaithe tar éis Brexit, mar aon le deireadh le bearta frithdhumpála maidir le Ace-K.
This likely scenario is supported by the evidence provided by the applicant of a significant loss of sales and market share in the UK following Brexit and the resulting removal of anti-dumping measures on Ace-K.
Ina thuairimí maidir leis an nochtadh deiridh, d’áitigh Anhui Jinhe nár bhain caillteanas suntasach díolacháin agus sciar den mhargadh sa Ríocht Aontaithe don iarratasóir tar éis deireadh a bheith curtha le dleachtanna frithdhumpála de dheasca Brexit.
In its comments on final disclosure, Anhui Jinhe argued that that the applicant did not suffer a significant loss of sales and market share in the UK following the removal of anti-dumping duties due to Brexit.