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Seoladh: Platinum Tower, office no. 2405, Jumeirah Lake Towers, Dubai, UAE
Address: Platinum Tower, office No 2405, Jumeirah Lake Towers, Dubai, UAE
Seoladh: Platinum Tower, office no. 2405, Jumeirah Lake Towers, Dubai, UAE
Address: Platinum Tower, office No 2405, Jumeirah Lake Towers, Dubai, UAE
Cárta cónaithe UAE: 784-1976-7135283-5
UAE resident card: 784-1976-7135283-5
Seoladh: Platinum Tower, office no. 2405, Jumeirah Lake Towers, Dubai, UAE
Address: Platinum Tower, office no. 2405, Jumeirah Lake Towers, Dubai, UAE
Cárta cónaithe UAE: 784-1976-7135283-5
UAE resident card: 784-1976-7135283-5
Seoladh: Platinum Tower, office No 2405, Jumeirah Lake Towers, Dubai, UAE;
Address: Platinum Tower, office No 2405, Jumeirah Lake Towers, Dubai, UAE;
Seoladh: Platinum Tower, office No 2405, Jumeirah Lake Towers, Dubai, UAE;
Address: Platinum Tower, office No 2405, Jumeirah Lake Towers, Dubai, UAE;
Aontas na nÉimíríochtaí Arabacha
UAE
Aontas na nÉimíríochtaí Arabacha
UAE
Aontas na nÉimíríochtaí Arabacha
UAE
Seoladh: Seoladh: Platinum Tower, office No 2405, Jumeirah Lake Towers, Dubai, UAE
Address: Platinum Tower, office No 2405, Jumeirah Lake Towers, Dubai, UAE
Cárta cónaithe UAE: 784 1976 7135283 5
UAE resident card: 784-1976-7135283-5
Cárta cónaithe UAE: 784 1976 7135283 5
UAE resident card: 784-1976-7135283-5
Seoladh: Seoladh: Platinum Tower, office No 2405, Jumeirah Lake Towers, Dubai, UAE;
Address: Platinum Tower, office No 2405, Jumeirah Lake Towers, Dubai, UAE ;
Seoladh: P.O. Box 86436, Dubai (UAE)
Address: P.O. Box 86436, Dubai (UAE)
Seoladh: P.O. Box 86436, Dubai (UAE)
Address: P.O. Box 86436, Dubai (UAE)
Ina theannta sin, tá foinsí eile soláthair amhail Aontas na nÉimíríochtaí Arabacha, an Úcráin agus an Éigipt fós ann.
In addition, other sources of supply such as UAE, Ukraine and Egypt still exist.
Déanann dhá struchtúr éagsúla bainistíocht ar an Aeracmhainneacht Leanúnach: ceann amháin lonnaithe sa Mholdóiv agus an dara ceann i Sharjah (AAE).
The Continuing Airworthiness management is carried out by two different structures: one located in Moldova and the second one in Sharjah (UAE).
Tá imircigh ar mian leo teorainn sheachtrach an Aontais a thrasnú ag eitilt go Mionsc ar bhord eitiltí a oibríonn Belavia ó roinnt tíortha sa Mheánoirthear, go háirithe an Liobáin, Aontas na nÉimíríochtaí Arabacha agus an Tuirc.
Migrants wishing to cross the Union's external border have been flying to Minsk on board flights operated by Belavia from a number of Middle Eastern countries, in particular Lebanon, UAE and Turkey.
Tá imircigh ar mian leo teorainn sheachtrach an Aontais a thrasnú ag eitilt go Mionsc ar bhord eitiltí a oibríonn Belavia ó roinnt tíortha sa Mheánoirthear, go háirithe an Liobáin, Aontas na nÉimíríochtaí Arabacha agus an Tuirc.
Migrants wishing to cross the Union's external border have been flying to Minsk on board flights operated by Belavia from a number of Middle Eastern countries, in particular Lebanon, UAE and Turkey.
Ag an gcruinniú iomlánach a bhí aige i mí an Mhárta 2022, chuir FATF Aontas na nÉimíríochtaí Arabacha lena liosta agus scrios sé an tSiombáib óna liosta.
At its plenary meeting in March 2022, the FATF added the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to its list and deleted Zimbabwe from its list.
D’ainneoin an tiomantais sin agus an dul chun cinn sin, níor tugadh aghaidh go hiomlán fós ar na hábhair imní as ar eascair liostú Aontas na nÉimíríochtaí Arabacha ag FATF.
Despite that commitment and progress, the concerns that led to the listing of the UAE by the FATF have not yet been fully addressed.
Dá bhrí sin, ba cheart Aontas na nÉimíríochtaí Arabacha a mheas a bheith ina thír ag a bhfuil easnaimh straitéiseacha ina córas AML/CFT faoi Airteagal 9 de Threoir (AE) 2015/849.
The UAE should therefore be considered as a country that has strategic deficiencies in its AML/CFT regime under Article 9 of Directive (EU) 2015/849.
Is cuideachta é Tradive General Trading Co (Tradive) atá lonnaithe in AEA arb é an Maor na bhFórsaí Mear-Thacaíochta, Algoney Hamdam Daglo, an deartháir is óige le Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), an stiúrthóir agus an t-úinéir tairbhiúil deiridh.
Tradive General Trading Co (Tradive) is a company based in the UAE whose director and ultimate beneficial owner is RSF Major Algoney Hamdan Dagalo, the youngest brother of Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti).
Sa chéad leath de 2019, allmhairíodh níos mó ná 1000 feithicil den sórt sin isteach sa tSúdáin ó AEA.
In the first half of 2019, more than one thousand such vehicles were imported into Sudan from the UAE.
Tuarascáil ó Phainéal EDT i gCás DS538 – an Phacastáin — BOPP Film (UAE), mír. 7.263.
WT Panel Report in Case DS538 – Pakistan – BOPP Film (UAE), para. 7.263.
Is cuideachta é Tradive General Trading Co (Tradive) atá lonnaithe in AEA arb é an Maor na bhFórsaí Mear-Thacaíochta, Algoney Hamdam Daglo, an deartháir is óige le Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), an stiúrthóir agus an t-úinéir tairbhiúil deiridh.
Tradive General Trading Co (Tradive) is a company based in the UAE whose director and ultimate beneficial owner is RSF Major Algoney Hamdan Dagalo, the youngest brother of Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti).
Sa chéad leath de 2019, allmhairíodh níos mó ná 1000 feithicil den sórt sin isteach sa tSúdáin ó AEA.
In the first half of 2019, more than one thousand such vehicles were imported into Sudan from the UAE.
I mí Feabhra 2022, rinne Aontas na nÉimíríochtaí Arabacha gealltanas polaitiúil ardleibhéil chun oibriú le FATF agus leis an Tascfhórsa um Ghníomhaíocht Airgeadais don Mheánoirthear agus don Afraic Thuaidh chun éifeachtacht a chórais AML/CFT a neartú.
In February 2022, the UAE made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime.
Ó shin i leith, léirigh Aontas na nÉimíríochtaí Arabacha dul chun cinn dearfach, lena n-áirítear trí acmhainní breise a chur ar fáil don Aonad um Fhaisnéis Airgeadais (AFA) chun anailís AFA a neartú agus trí fhaisnéis airgeadais a chur ar fáil d’Údaráis Forfheidhmithe Dlí agus do na hIonchúisitheoirí Poiblí chun bagairtí ardriosca sciúrtha airgid a chomhrac.
Since then, the UAE demonstrated positive progress, including by providing additional resources to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) to strengthen the FIU analysis and providing financial intelligence to Law Enforcement Authorities and the Public Prosecutors for combating of high-risk ML threats.
Dá bhrí sin, is é conclúid mheasúnú an Choimisiúin gur cheart Poblacht Dhaonlathach an Chongó, Giobráltar, Mósaimbíc, an Tansáin agus Aontas na nÉimíríochtaí Arabacha a mheas a bheith ina ndlínsí tríú tír ag a bhfuil easnaimh straitéiseacha ina gcórais AML/CFT, ar easnaimh iad atá ina mbagairtí suntasacha ar chóras airgeadais an Aontais, i gcomhréir leis na critéir a leagtar amach in Airteagal 9 de Threoir (AE) 2015/849.
The Commission’s assessment therefore concludes that the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gibraltar, Mozambique, Tanzania, and the UAE should be considered as third-country jurisdictions which have strategic deficiencies in their AML/CFT regimes that pose significant threats to the financial system of the Union, in accordance with the criteria set out in Article 9 of Directive (EU) 2015/849.
Ina theannta sin, bhí foinsí malartacha soláthair ann ina thuairim, amhail díolacháin táirgeoirí Eorpacha eile Duktus-VONROLL agus TRM, agus trí allmhairí ón Tuirc, ó UAE, ón tSín agus ón Iaráin, agus ón gcuideachta Indiach Jindal.
Furthermore, alternative sources of supply existed in its view, such as sales of other European producers Duktus-VonRoll and TRM, and through imports from Turkey, UAE, China and Iran, and from the Indian company Jindal.
Léirigh SG PAM freisin idirbhearta féideartha a luaitear i gcuntais bhliantúla eintitis ECL idir ECL agus Electrosteel Algeria SPA, Electrosteel Castings Gulf FZE (UAE), Electrosteel Bahrain Holding WLL (Bairéin), agus Electrosteel Doha for Trading LLC (Catar), gur cheart don Choimisiún féachaint ar rannpháirtíocht fhéideartha na n-eintiteas sin i ndíolacháin an táirge lena mbaineann ar mhargadh an Aontais a fhíorú.
SG PAM also pointed out potential transactions that are mentioned in ECL’s entities annual accounts between ECL and Electrosteel Algeria SPA, Electrosteel Castings Gulf FZE (UAE), Electrosteel Bahrain Holding WLL (Bahrain), and Electrosteel Doha for Trading LLC (Qatar), that the Commission should look at to verify a possible involvement of these entities in the sales of the product concerned on the Union market.
Baineann na Fórsaí Mear-Thacaíochta úsáid freisin as táirgeadh óir agus a onnmhairí Al Junaid chun tacaíocht mhíleata a fháil ó Aontas na nÉimíríochtaí Arabacha (AEA), a ndéantar an chuid is mó de tháirgeadh óir na Súdáine a smuigleáil chuige, agus ó Ghrúpa Wagner, lena n-áirítear soláthar arm a úsáideann na Fórsaí Mear-Thacaíochta sa choinbhleacht sa tSúdáin.
The RSF is also using Al Junaid’s gold production and exports to secure military support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to which most of Sudan’s gold production is smuggled, and from the Wagner Group, including the provision of weapons used by the RSF in the conflict in Sudan.
Baineann na Fórsaí Mear-Thacaíochta úsáid freisin as táirgeadh óir agus a onnmhairí Al Junaid chun tacaíocht mhíleata a fháil ó Aontas na nÉimíríochtaí Arabacha (AEA), a ndéantar an chuid is mó de tháirgeadh óir na Súdáine a smuigleáil chuige, agus ó Ghrúpa Wagner, lena n-áirítear soláthar arm a úsáideann na Fórsaí Mear-Thacaíochta sa choinbhleacht sa tSúdáin.
The RSF is also using Al Junaid’s gold production and exports to secure military support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to which most of Sudan’s gold production is smuggled, and from the Wagner Group, including the provision of weapons used by the RSF in the conflict in Sudan.
Ba cheart d’Aontas na nÉimíríochtaí Arabacha leanúint de bheith ag obair chun a phlean gníomhaíochta FATF a chur chun feidhme tríd an méid seo a leanas a dhéanamh: (1) méadú leanúnach a léiriú, trí chás-staidéir agus staidreamh, ar iarrataí ar Chúnamh Frithpháirteach Dlí amach chun cuidiú le himscrúdú ar an Maoiniú Sceimhlitheoireachta (TF), ar an Sciúradh Airgid (ML), agus ar phreideacáidí ardriosca a éascú; (2) comhthuiscint ar rioscaí ML/TF idir na hearnálacha agus na hinstitiúidí éagsúla DNFBP a fheabhsú agus a chothabháil; (3) méadú a léiriú ar an líon agus ar an gcáilíocht tuairiscí ar idirbhearta amhrasacha a chomhdaíonn institiúidí airgeadais agus Gnólachtaí agus Gairmeacha Neamhairgeadais Ainmnithe (DNFBPanna); (4) tuiscint níos mionsonraithe a áirithiú ar an riosca go mbainfí mí-úsáid as daoine dlítheanacha agus, i gcás inarb infheidhme, socruithe dlíthiúla, i gcás ML/TF; (5) a léiriú go mbaintear úsáid níos mó as faisnéis airgeadais chun bagairtí ardriosca sciúrtha airgid a shaothrú; agus méadú leanúnach a léiriú ar imscrúduithe agus ionchúisimh éifeachtacha ar chineálacha éagsúla cásanna sciúrtha airgid atá comhsheasmhach le próifíl riosca Aontas na nÉimíríochtaí Arabacha; agus (6) imghabháil smachtbhannaí a shainaithint agus a chomhrac go réamhghníomhach, lena n-áirítear trí thuiscint níos fearr a léiriú ar imghabháil smachtbhannaí san earnáil phríobháideach.
The UAE should continue to work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) demonstrating through case studies and statistics a sustained increase in outbound Mutual Legal Assistance requests to help facilitate investigation of Terrorism Financing (TF), Money-Laundering (ML), and high-risk predicates; (2) enhancing and maintaining a shared understanding of the ML/TF risks between the different DNFBP sectors and institutions; (3) showing an increase in the number and quality of STRs filed by FIs and Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs); (4) ensuring a more granular understanding of the risk of abuse of legal persons and, where applicable, legal arrangements, for ML/TF; (5) demonstrate greater use of financial intelligence to pursue high-risk ML threats; and demonstrating a sustained increase in effective investigations and prosecutions of different types of ML cases consistent with the UAE’s risk profile; and (6) proactively identifying and combating sanctions evasion, including by demonstrating a better understanding of sanctions evasion among the private sector.