#1699986
morgáistí a fhuascailt nó a fhoriamh;
the redemption or foreclosure of mortgages;
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#2647357
foriamh frithiomaíoch soláthróirí nó ceannaitheoirí eile trí bhacainní a chur suas roimh iontráil nó roimh leathnú;
anti-competitive foreclosure of other suppliers or other buyers, by raising barriers to entry or expansion;
#2647361
D’fhéadfadh foriamh, iomaíocht a mhaolú agus claonpháirteachas ar leibhéal an dáileora díobháil a dhéanamh do thomhaltóirí, go háirithe trí phraghsanna miondíola earraí nó seirbhísí a mhéadú;
Foreclosure, softening of competition and collusion at the supplier level may harm consumers, in particular by:
#2647366
D’fhéadfadh foriamh, iomaíocht a mhaolú agus claonpháirteachas ar leibhéal an dáileora díobháil a dhéanamh do thomhaltóirí, go háirithe trí phraghsanna miondíola earraí nó seirbhísí a mhéadú;
Foreclosure, softening of competition and collusion at the distributor level may harm consumers, in particular by:
#2647791
Féadfar géarú ar fhoriamh dáileoirí eile i gcás ilcheadanna díoltóra eisiacha.
The foreclosure of other distributors may be aggravated in the case of multiple exclusive dealerships.
#2648548
Is lú an dóchúlacht go mbeidh foriamh ann i gcás táirge idirmheánach.
Foreclosure is less likely in the case of an intermediate product.
#2648564
D’fhéadfadh éifeacht charnach foriaimh teacht chun cinn freisin ar an leibhéal miondíola.
A cumulative foreclosure effect may also arise at the retail level.
#2648624
Is é an príomhriosca iomaíochta a bhaineann le soláthar eisiach é foriamh frithiomaíoch ceannaitheoirí eile.
The main competition risk of exclusive supply is anti-competitive foreclosure of other buyers.
#2648642
Tá riosca ann dá bhrí sin go dtarlóidh foriamh go príomha i gcás soláthróirí laga agus ceannaitheoirí láidre.
Foreclosure is therefore mainly a risk in the case of weak suppliers and strong buyers.
#2648843
Uaireanta d’fhéadfadh foriamh frithiomaíoch dáileoirí eile a bheith mar thoradh ar íocaíochtaí rochtana tosaigh.
Upfront access payments can result in anti-competitive foreclosure of other distributors.
#2648847
Mar eisceacht, d’fhéadfadh éifeachtaí foriaimh réamhtheachtacha frithiomaíocha tarlú mar thoradh ar íocaíochtaí rochtana roimh ré.
Exceptionally, upfront access payments may result in anti-competitive upstream foreclosure effects.
#2931705
Laghdú ar fhiachas príobháideach a éascú, lena n-áirítear trí chreat éifeachtach maidir le foriaimh a chur chun feidhme.
Facilitate the reduction of private debt, including by implementing an effective foreclosure framework.
#2985172
Léirítear leis an meastachán ar easnaimh ionchasacha airgid maidir le hionstraim airgeadais chomhthaobhaithe méid agus uainiú sreafa airgid a bhfuil coinne leis ó fhoriamh na comhthaobhachta lúide na costais a bhaineann le fáil agus díol na comhthaobhachta, gan beann ar cé acu atá nó nach bhfuil foriamh dóchúil (i.e. breithnítear sa mheastachán ar shreabhadh airgid ionchasach dóchúlacht foriata agus an tsreafa airgid a leanfadh as).
The estimate of expected cash shortfalls on a collateralised financial instrument reflects the amount and timing of cash flows that are expected from foreclosure on the collateral less the costs of obtaining and selling the collateral, irrespective of whether foreclosure is probable (ie the estimate of expected cash flows considers the probability of a foreclosure and the cash flows that would result from it).
#283290
(15) Féadfaidh dúnadh an mhargaidh ar feadh tréimhse atá níos faide ná mar is gá a bheith mar thoradh ar chonarthaí fadtéarmacha, rud a bhaineann de shochair an bhrú iomaíoch.
(15) Contracts of long duration can lead to market foreclosure for a longer period than is necessary, thus diminishing the benefits of competitive pressure.
#254742
(3) Gach agra chun aon mhorgáiste, muirear nó lian ar aon tailte, nó ar aon mhaoin eile, réadach, airnéise réadaí, nó pearsanta, a fhoriamh, a dhíol, a fhuascailt nó a chur i bhfeidhm;
(3) All suits for foreclosure, sale, redemption of or for enforcing any mortgage, charge or lien upon any lands, or upon any other property, real, chattel real, or personal;
#583315
Níor cheart go méadófaí le Gníomhaireacht Rátála Creidmheasa a aithint mar Institiúid um Measúnú Creidmheasa Sheachtrach (IMCS) foriamh margaidh a bhfuil forlámhas ag trí ghnóthas lárnacha air cheana féin.
The recognition of a credit rating agency as an external credit assessment institution (ECAI) should not increase the foreclosure of a market already dominated by three main undertakings.
#764592
a mhorgáiste do ghlaoch isteach ná éinní do dhéanamh chun aon cheart roimh-chlabhsúir ná díolacháin d'fheidhmiú ná chun a urrús do chur i bhfeidhm ná chun colann an airgid a cuireadh in áirithe leis an urrús san d'fháil thar n-ais ar aon tslí eile:
to call in his mortgage or to take any steps for exercising any right of foreclosure or sale, or for otherwise enforcing his security or for recovering the principal money thereby secured:
#2003705
I gcás fiacha neamhíoctha a bheith fós ann tar éis imeachtaí foriaimh, ba cheart do na Ballstáit a áirithiú go gcosnófar dálaí íosta maireachtála agus ba cheart dóibh bearta a chur i bhfeidhm chun aisíocaíocht fiach a éascú agus rófhéichiúnas fadtéarmach á sheachaint ag an am céanna.
Where after foreclosure proceedings outstanding debt remains, Member States should ensure the protection of minimum living conditions and put in place measures to facilitate debt repayment while avoiding long-term over-indebtedness.
#2004127
Ceanglóidh na Ballstáit ar chreidiúnaithe beartais agus nósanna imeachta leormhaithe a bheith acu ionas go ndéanfaidh siad iarrachtaí, i gcás inarb iomchuí, ar staonadh réasúnta a fheidhmiú sula dtionscnófar imeachtaí foriaimh.
Member States shall require creditors to have adequate policies and procedures so that they make efforts to exercise, where appropriate, reasonable forbearance before foreclosure proceedings are initiated.
#2027458
Nochtfar sa ró seo an éifeacht ar ollsuim ghlanluacha ionstraime i ngeall ar fhoriamh de chineál ar bith comhthaobhachta.
The effect on the gross carrying amount of an instrument due to the foreclosure of any kind of collateral shall be disclosed in this row.
#2647288
Mar a mhínítear tuilleadh i roinn 2.2. thíos, d’fhéadfadh sé go dtiocfadh foriamh, maolú iomaíochta nó claonpháirteachas as srianta ingearacha go háirithe.
As further explained in section 2.2., vertical restraints can notably lead to foreclosure, softening of competition or collusion.
#2647391
Tugtar soiléiriú san Fhógra De Minimis nach meastar i gcoitinne go rannchuidíonn soláthróirí nó dáileoirí aonair nach mó ná 5 % a sciar den mhargadh le héifeacht foriaimh charnach.
The De Minimis Notice clarifies that individual suppliers or distributors with a market share not exceeding 5 % are in general not considered to contribute significantly to a cumulative foreclosure effect.
#2647752
Ar deireadh, féadfaidh foriamh dáileoirí eile eascairt as dáileadh eisiach agus iomaíocht aonbhranda a laghdú leis sin ar an leibhéal dáileacháin.
Lastly, exclusive distribution may lead to the foreclosure of other distributors and thereby reduce both inter-brand and intra-brand competition at the distributor level.
#2647895
I gcás ina n-úsáideann formhór na bpríomhsholáthraithe i margadh dáileadh roghnaíoch, d’fhéadfadh sé go dtiocfadh foriamh cineálacha áirithe dáileoirí, mar shampla lascainíoirí praghsanna, mar thoradh air sin.
where selective distribution is used by a majority of the leading suppliers in a market, this may lead to foreclosure of certain types of distributors, for instance price discounters.
#2647910
Baineann bacainní iontrála le hábhar go príomha i gcás dáileoirí neamhúdaraithe a fhoriamh ón margadh.
Entry barriers are mainly relevant in the case of foreclosure of non-authorised distributors from the market.
#2647915
Maidir le díoltoirí níos éifeachtúla a fhoriamh ón margadh, féadfaidh sé sin teacht chun cinn go háirithe i gcás ina bhforchuirfidh eagraíocht láidir díoltóirí critéir roghnúcháin ar an soláthróir lena ndíreofar ar an dáileadh a theorannú ar mhaithe lena chomhaltaí féin.
Foreclosure of more efficient distributors from the market may arise where a strong distributor organisation imposes selection criteria on the supplier aimed at limiting distribution to the advantage of its members.
#2647922
I gcás nach gcomhcheanglaítear dáileadh roghnaitheach le hoibleagáid neamhiomaíochta, d’fhéadfadh sé gur ábhar imní fós é foriamh soláthróirí iomaíocha ón margadh.
Where selective distribution is not combined with a non-compete obligation, foreclosure of competing suppliers from the market may still be a concern.
#2648008
I bhfianaise líon ard na n-asraonta a bhíonn ar fáil do tháirgeoirí milseán eile, ní eascraíonn aon fhoriamh tromchúiseach as.
In view of the high number of outlets available to other sweet producers, it does not lead to any serious foreclosure.
#2648335
Foriamh soláthróra iomaíoch trí chineál baghcait chomhchoitinn a bheadh ina leithéid de chás.
Such a scenario could lead to foreclosure of a competing supplier through a form of collective boycott.
#2648397
Dá bhrí sin, d’fhéadfaí nach ndéanfaí difear do chomhaontuithe d’fhad níos lú nó de chineál nach bhfuil chomh sriantach céanna, i bhfianaise an fhoriaimh níos lú is inchurtha i leith srianta den sórt sin.
Thus, agreements of a shorter duration or of a less restrictive nature may be left unaffected, in view of the lesser degree of foreclosure attributable to such restraints.
#2648530
Is dóchúla go mbeidh foriamh frithiomaíoch ina thoradh ar oibleagáidí ceangail aonbhranda nuair is iad cuideachtaí ceannasacha a dtugtar i gcrích iad.
Single branding obligations are more likely to result in anti-competitive foreclosure when entered into by dominant undertakings.
#2648533
Ní dócha go dtarlódh foriamh iomaitheoirí i gcás ina bhfuil suíomh comhchosúil ar an margadh acu agus ina bhféadfaidh siad táirgí atá chomh tarraingteach céanna a thairiscint.
Foreclosure of competitors is not very likely where they hold similar market positions and can offer similarly attractive products.
#2648540
Chun a chinneadh an dócha go ndéanfar foriamh frithiomaíoch, is gá measúnú a dhéanamh ar scála na mbacainní iontrála.
To determine whether anti-competitive foreclosure is likely, it is necessary to assess the scale of entry barriers.
#2648541
Sna cásanna ina bhfuil sé sách éasca ar sholáthróirí iomaíocha a líonra dáileacháin comhtháite féin a chruthú nó dáileoirí malartacha a aimsiú dá dtáirge, ní dócha go mbeadh an foriamh ina fhadhb mhór.
Where it is relatively easy for competing suppliers to create their own integrated distribution network or find alternative distributors for their product, foreclosure is unlikely to be a real problem.
#2648550
D’fhéadfadh iarmhairtí foriaimh fhrithiomaíoch a bheith mar thoradh ar bhrandáil aonair, áfach, faoi leibhéal na ceannasachta i gcásanna ina bhfuil tionchar carnach ann.
However, single branding may lead to anti-competitive foreclosure effects below the level of dominance in cases where there is a cumulative effect situation.
#2648553
Níl aon riosca dáiríre foriaimh ann más féidir le monaróirí iomaíocha a gcóras mórdhíola féin a bhunú go héasca.
There is no real risk of foreclosure if competing manufacturers can easily establish their own wholesaling system.
#2648599
Is deacra fós d’iontrálaithe féideartha teacht isteach sa mhargadh i gceantair a bhfuil daonra mór iontu, áit a bhfuil níos mó foriaimh fós ann, cé gur sna ceantair sin ar fearr leo teacht isteach sa mhargadh.
Potential entrants find entry even more difficult in the densely populated areas, where foreclosure is even higher, even though it is in those areas that they would prefer to enter the market.
#2648633
Dá airde an sciar den mhargadh atá faoi cheangal, agus dá fhaide an oibleagáid maidir le soláthar eisiach, is ea is suntasaí an éifeacht foriaimh is dócha a bheidh ann.
The higher the tied supply share, and the longer the duration of the exclusive supply obligation, the more significant the foreclosure effect is likely to be.
#2648636
Ní ródhócha go bhforiafar ceannaitheoirí iomaíocha i gcás ina bhfuil cumhacht na gceannaitheoirí sin agus an cheannaitheora atá ina pháirtí sa chomhaontú comhchosúil agus ina bhfuil ar a chumas dóibh féidearthachtaí comhchosúla díolachán a thairiscint do na soláthróirí.
Foreclosure of competing buyers is not very likely where these competitors have similar buying power to that of the buyer party to the agreement and can offer the suppliers similar sales possibilities.
#2648638
D’fhéadfadh tarraingt siar thairbhe Rialachán (AE) 2022/720 a bheith mar thoradh ar éifeacht foriaimh charnach den sórt sin.
Such a cumulative foreclosure effect may lead to withdrawal of the benefit of Regulation (EU) 2022/720.
#2648639
Tá bacainní ar iontráil ar leibhéal an tsoláthróra mar aon le méid na mbacainní sin ábhartha maidir le measúnú a dhéanamh ar cé acu atá fíor-fhoriamh ann nó nach bhfuil.
The existence of entry barriers at the supplier level, as well as their size are relevant to assessing whether there is foreclosure.
#2648640
A mhéid a bheidh sé éifeachtúil do cheannaitheoirí iomaíocha na hearraí nó na seirbhísí a sholáthar iad féin trí chomhtháthú ingearach réamhtheachtach, ní dócha gur fíorfhadhb a bheidh san fhoriamh.
In as far as it is efficient for competing buyers to provide the goods or services themselves via upstream vertical integration, foreclosure is unlikely to be a problem.
#2648646
Ar deireadh, tá leibhéal na trádála agus nádúr an táirge ábhartha chun na héifeachtaí foriaimh a d’fhéadfadh a bheith ann a mheas.
Lastly, the level in the production or distribution chain and the nature of the product are relevant to the assessment of possible foreclosure effects.
#2648647
Is lú seans go dtarlóidh foriamh frithiomaíoch i gcás táirge idirmheánach nó i gcás ina bhfuil an táirge aonchineálach.
Anti-competitive foreclosure is less likely in the case of an intermediate product, or where the product is homogeneous.
#2648662
Mar gheall ar na hinfheistíochtaí suntasacha, is dócha go gcomhlíonfaidh an comhaontú coinníollacha Airteagal 101(3) den Chonradh i bhfianaise na n-éifeachtúlachtaí agus na héifeachta teoranta foriaimh atá ann.
Given the considerable investments by both parties, the agreement is likely to fulfil the conditions of Article 101(3) of the Treaty, in view of the efficiencies and the limited foreclosure effect.
#2648664
Tá foriamh chuid d’éileamh cheannaitheoir B in aghaidh soláthróirí eile teoranta do mhéid uasta 40 % den mhargadh.
The foreclosure of part of buyer B’s demand to other suppliers is limited to a maximum of 40 % of the market.
#2648845
I gcás den sórt sin, d’fhéadfadh íocaíochtaí rochtana roimh ré an éifeacht foriaimh iartheachtach chéanna a bheith acu agus a bheadh ag oibleagáid eisiach den chineál soláthair.
In such a case, upfront access payments may have the same downstream foreclosure effect as an exclusive supply type of obligation.
#2648852
Sa bhreis ar éifeachtaí foriaimh féideartha, d’fhéadfadh íocaíochtaí rochtana roimh ré an iomaíocht a dhéanamh níos boige agus claonpháirteachas idir dáileoirí a éascú.
In addition to possible foreclosure effects, upfront access payments may soften competition and facilitate collusion between distributors.
#2648870
Chun measúnú a dhéanamh ar an dóchúlacht go dtarlódh éifeacht foriaimh réamhtheachtach den sórt sin, is féidir an treoraíocht a bhaineann le hoibleagáidí ceangail aonbhranda a chur i bhfeidhm de réir analaí (go háirithe míreanna (298) go (318)).
To assess the likelihood of such an upstream foreclosure effect, the guidance relating to single branding obligations may be applied by analogy (in particular paragraphs (298) to (318)).
#2648887
D’fhéadfadh éifeachtaí foriaimh frithiomaíocha ar an margadh nasctha, ar an margadh a dhéanann nasc, nó ar an dá mhargadh sin an tráth céanna, a bheith mar thoradh ar nascadh.
Tying may lead to anti-competitive foreclosure effects on the tied market, the tying market, or both at the same time.