Tá téacs Chód IPI bunaithe ar Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála 1994 den chuid is mó, ach imíonn sé ón gComhaontú sin nuair atá údar leis i ngeall ar an ngné speisialta a bhaineann le hidirbhearta um cheannach loinge.
The text of the IPI Code is mainly based on the 1994 Anti-Dumping Agreement, but deviates from that Agreement when warranted by the specific nature of ship-purchase transactions.
Cuirfidh gach Páirtí bearta frithdhumpála agus frithchúitimh i bhfeidhm i gcomhréir le ceanglais an Chomhaontaithe Frithdhumpála agus Chomhaontú SCM, agus de bhun próiseas cothrom agus trédhearcach.
Each Party shall apply anti-dumping and countervailing measures in accordance with the requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement, and pursuant to a fair and transparent process.
ciallaíonn ‘Comhaontú Frithdhumpála’ an Comhaontú maidir le hAirteagal VI den Chomhaontú Ginearálta um Tharaifí agus Trádáil a Chur chun Feidhme 1994
"Anti-dumping Agreement" means the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994;
Chun críche an Airteagail seo, déanfar páirtithe leasmhara a shainiú de réir Airteagal 6(11) den Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála agus Airteagal 12.9 de Chomhaontú SCM.
For the purpose of this Article, interested parties shall be defined as per Article 6.11 of the Anti-dumping Agreement and Article 12.9 of the SCM Agreement.
Sna barúlacha uaidh, léirigh táirgeoir onnmhairiúcháin amháin, Xiamen Xiashun, ar an gcéad dul síos, nach bhfuil Airteagal 2(6a) i gcomhréir le Comhaontú Frithdhumpála EDT (“ADA”).
In its comments, one exporting producer, Xiamen Xiashun, firstly pointed out that Article 2(6a) is inconsistent with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (‘ADA’).
Thairis sin, ina bharúil ar an tionscnamh, líomhain Xiamen ar an gcéad dul síos nach bhfuil Airteagal 2(6a) i gcomhréir le Comhaontú Frithdhumpála EDT (“ADA”).
Furthermore, in its comments on initiation, Xiamen, firstly alleged that Article 2(6a) is inconsistent with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (‘ADA’).
Agus gníomh á dhéanamh i gcoinne allmhairí, níl aon cheanglas faoin gComhaontú Frithdhumpála measúnú a dhéanamh ar dhálaí an mhargaidh intíre thar an anailís fhorordaithe ar dhíobháil.
When taking action against imports, there is no requirement under the Anti-Dumping Agreement to assess domestic market conditions beyond the prescribed injury analysis.
Go bhfuil Airteagal 2(6a) den bhun-Rialachán ar neamhréir le hAirteagal 2.2 agus 2.2.1.1 de Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála EDT (“ADA”) agus le dlí-eolaíocht EDT;
Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation is inconsistent with the Article 2.2 and 2.2.1.1 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (‘ADA’) and the WTO jurisprudence;
Ina theannta sin, thug CCCME an bharúil go dtéann coincheap an tsaofa shuntasaigh in aghaidh dhlí na hEagraíochta Domhanda Trádála (“EDT”) toisc nach ann don choincheap sin faoi Airteagal 2.2 de Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála EDT (“ADA”).
In addition, CCCME commented that the concept of significant distortions runs against the WTO law because such concept does not exist under Article 2.2 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (‘ADA’).
Ina bharúlacha, chuir an táirgeoir onnmhairiúcháin in iúl freisin nach bhfuil Airteagal 2(6a) ag teacht le Comhaontú Frithdhumpála na hEagraíochta Domhanda Trádála.
In its comments, the exporting producer further pointed out that Article 2(6a) is inconsistent with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (‘ADA’).
I ngeall nár scaipeadh an iarraidh nuashonraithe sin ar athbhreithniú ar na páirtithe, sháraigh an Coimisiún, dar leis, Airteagal 6.1.2 agus Airteagal 6.4 de Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála EDT.
By not circulating such updated review request to the parties, the Commission violated in its view Article 6.1.2 and Article 6.4 of the WTO’s Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Níl aon fhoráil i gComhaontú Frithdhumpála ETD lena gceanglaítear ar an gCoimisiún a thorthaí a bhunú ar an tréimhse chéanna a shainítear san iarraidh ar athbhreithniú éaga.
The WTO’s Anti-Dumping Agreement does not contain any provision requiring the Commission to base its findings on the same period as defined in the expiry review request.
Dá bhrí sin, mheas an Coimisiún nár sháraigh sé aon chearta nós imeachta ná nár sháraigh sé Comhaontú Frithdhumpála ETD agus dhiúltaigh sé don mhaíomh.
Therefore, the Commission considered that it did not breach any procedural rights or violated the WTO’s Anti-Dumping Agreement and rejected the claim.
Agus na fíorais ionaid á roghnú, ní cheanglaítear le hAirteagal 6.8 de Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála EDT ar na húdaráis imscrúdúcháin na fíorais sin “is fabhraí” a roghnú don pháirtí neamh-chomhoibríoch.
In selecting the replacement facts, Article 6.8 of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement does not require investigating authorities to select those facts that are most ‘favourable’ to the non-cooperating party.
Mhaígh rialtas na Rúise nár chuir an t-iarratasóir fianaise leordhóthanach i láthair den dumpáil mhéadaithe, mar a luaitear in Airteagal 5.2 den Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála, agus gnáthluach á ríomh.
The Russian government claimed that the applicant did not present sufficient evidence of the increased dumping, as stated in Article 5.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement, while calculating normal value.
Dá bhrí sin, d’iarr Rialtas na Brasaíle ar an gCoimisiún anailís a dhéanamh ar an gcúinse sin ar bhealach neamhiomarcach maidir leis na táscairí eile in Airteagal 3 den Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála.
Therefore, the GOB requested the Commission to analyse this factor in a non-redundant manner in relation to other indicators contained in Article 3 of the Anti-dumping Agreement.
Ní rud é sin atá ina shárú ar Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála EDT, ós rud nach bhfuil sé ina cheangal ar na húdaráis imscrúdúcháin faoin gComhaontú sin ríomhanna a dhéanamh nach féidir a úsáid chun corrlach dumpála a shuí.
This is not in violation of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, since that Agreement does not require investigating authorities to perform calculations which cannot be used to establish a dumping margin.
Is cosúil nach mbaineann na cásanna EDT a luaigh Giant le hábhar, ós rud é nach gcuireann siad in amhras go síneann Airteagal 5.10 de Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála EDT thar imscrúduithe bunaidh.
The WTO cases cited by Giant appear to be irrelevant since they do not put into question that Article 5.10 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement extends beyond original investigations.
Ar an dara dul síos, mhaígh CISA nach sainaithnítear i gComhaontú Frithdhumpála EDT (“ADA”) coincheap an tsaofa shuntasaigh in Airteagal 2.2 ADA.
Second, CISA submitted that the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (‘ADA’) does not recognize the concept of significant distortions in Article 2.2 of ADA.
Ar an dara dul síos, mhaígh CISA nach sainaithnítear i gComhaontú Frithdhumpála EDT (‘ADA’) coincheap an tsaofa shuntasaigh in Airteagal 2.2 ADA.
Second, CISA submitted that the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (‘ADA’) does not recognize the concept of significant distortions in Article 2.2 of ADA.
dleacht frithdhumpála nó frithchúitimh a cuireadh i bhfeidhm i gcomhréir le GATT 1994, leis an gComhaontú Frithdhumpála agus leis an gComhaontú FBF; agus
anti-dumping or countervailing duty applied in conformity with GATT 1994, the Anti-dumping Agreement, and the SCM Agreement; and
ciallaíonn ‘Comhaontú Frithdhumpála’ an Comhaontú maidir le hAirteagal VI den Chomhaontú Ginearálta um Tharaifí agus Thrádáil 1994 a Chur chun Feidhme, atá in Iarscríbhinn 1A a ghabhann le Comhaontú EDT;
“Anti-dumping Agreement” means the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, contained in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement;
Bhí cinneadh an Choimisiúin maidir le scrúdú a dhéanamh go carnach ar allmhairí ón tSín agus ón Tuirc i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 3(4) den bhun-Rialachán agus le hAirteagal 3.3 de Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála ETD.
The Commission’s decision to examine imports from China and Türkiye cumulatively was in line with Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation and Article 3.3 of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement.
Ina theannta sin, leis an anailís is léir go gcomhlíontar caighdeán na ‘dóchúlachta’ dá bhforáiltear sa bhun-Rialachán agus i gComhaontú Frithdhumpála EDT araon.
Furthermore, the analysis clearly meets the ‘likely’ standard provided for in both the basic Regulation and the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement.
Mar a mhínítear in aithris (257), sásaíodh go soiléir in anailís an Choimisiúin an caighdeán dlíthiúil is infheidhme faoin mbun-Rialachán agus faoin gComhaontú Frithdhumpála araon, agus bhí sí bunaithe ar fhianaise dhearfach.
As explained in recital (257), the Commission’s analysis clearly met the applicable legal standard under both the basic Regulation and the Anti-Dumping Agreement and was based on positive evidence.
(2) Sna tuarascálacha sin, fuarthas, inter alia, nach raibh Airteagal 9(5) de Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 1225/2009 ón gComhairle an 30 Samhain 2009 maidir le cosaint i gcoinne allmhairí dumpáilte ó thíortha nach comhaltaí den Chomhphobal Eorpach iad [3] ("An bun-Rialachán Frithdhumpála") comhsheasmhach le hAirteagal 6.10, le hAirteagal 9.2 ná le hAirteagal 18.4 de Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála WTO ná le hAirteagal XVI:4 de Chomhaontú WTO.
(2) In the Reports, it was found, inter alia, that Article 9(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community [3] ("Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation") was inconsistent with Articles 6.10, 9.2 and 18.4 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement.
(4) Thug an Comhlacht Achomhairc soiléiriú, áfach, le linn dó corrlach dumpála aonair agus dleacht frithdhumpála aonair a chinneadh le haghaidh líon onnmhaireoirí, go mbraithfidh comhsheasmhacht an chinnidh sin le hAirteagal 6.10 agus le hAirteagal 9.2 de Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála WTO ar staideanna a bheith ann lena léirítear go bhfuil dhá onnmhaireoir nó níos mó i gcaidreamh de chineál ar dá bharr gur cheart cóir a chur orthu mar eintiteas amháin, cé go bhfuil siad leithleach go dlíthiúil.
(4) However, the Appellate Body clarified that, when determining a single dumping margin and a single anti-dumping duty for a number of exporters, the consistency of that determination with Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement will depend on the existence of situations indicating that two or more exporters, albeit legally distinct, are in such a relationship that they should be treated as a single entity.
Mar shampla, chinn painéal Chomhlacht um Réiteach Díospóide na hEagraíochta Domhanda Trádála i ndíospóid DS405 "an tAontas Eorpach — Bearta Frithdhumpála maidir le Coisbhearta Áirithe ón tSín" [4] (tuarascáil a glacadh an 22 Feabhra 2012) nár shuigh an tSín gur ghníomhaigh an tAontas ar bhealach nach raibh comhsheasmhach le hAirteagal 2.4 ná le hAirteagal 6.10.2 den Chomhaontas Frithdhumpála, Mír 15(a)(ii) de Phrótacal Aontachas na Síne, agus Mír 151(e) agus (f) de Thuarascáil Meithle faoi Aontachas na Síne, tríd an gcaoi ar mhainnigh sé na hiarratais ar chóir gheilleagair mhargaidh a rinne táirgeoirí onnmhairiúcháin comhoibríocha Síneacha nár áiríodh sa sampla le haghaidh an imscrúdaithe bhunaidh, a chur isteach.
For example, the panel of the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organisation in the dispute DS405 "European Union — Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear from China" [4] (report adopted on 22 February 2012) found that China did not establish that the Union acted inconsistently with Articles 2.4 and 6.10.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement, paragraph 15(a)(ii) of China’s Accession Protocol, and paragraph 151(e) and (f) of China’s Accession Working Party Report, by failing to examine the market economy treatment applications of the cooperating Chinese exporting producers that were not part of the sample for the original investigation.
I gcreat an Chomhaontaithe Longthógála, aithníodh nach raibh sé praiticiúil, i ngeall ar thréithe speisialta a bhaineann le hidirbhearta um cheannach loinge, dleachtanna frithchúitimh agus frithdhumpála a chur i bhfeidhm orthu, dleachtanna dá bhforáiltear faoi Airteagal VI den Chomhaontú Ginearálta um Tharaifí agus Trádáil, faoin gComhaontú maidir le Fóirdheontais agus Bearta Frithchúitimh, agus faoin gComhaontú maidir le hAirteagal VI den Chomhaontú Ginearálta um Tharaifí agus Trádáil 1994 a Chur Chun Feidhme (“Comhaontú Frithdhumpála 1994”) atá i gceangal leis an gComhaontú lena mbunaítear an Eagraíocht Dhomhanda Trádála.
It has been recognised in the framework of the Shipbuilding Agreement that the special characteristics of ship-purchase transactions have made it impractical to apply countervailing and anti-dumping duties, as provided for under Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (‘the 1994 Anti-Dumping Agreement’) annexed to the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation.
Sa Chomhaontú ar Chur Chun Feidhme Airteagal IV de Chomhaontú Ginearálta um Tharaifí agus Trádáil 1994 (“Comhaontú Frithdhumpála 1994”) tá rialacha mionsonraithe, a bhaineann go háirithe le dumpáil a ríomh, nósanna imeachta maidir le himscrúdú a thionscnamh agus a leanúint, lena n-áirítear na fíorais a shuíomh agus a láimhseáil, bearta sealadacha a fhorchur, dleachtanna frithdhumpála a fhorchur agus a bhailiú, ré agus athbhreithniú na mbeart frithdhumpála agus nochtadh poiblí d'fhaisnéis a bhaineann le himscrúduithe frithdhumpála.
The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (‘the 1994 Anti-Dumping Agreement’) contains detailed rules, relating in particular to the calculation of dumping, procedures for initiating and pursuing an investigation, including the establishment and treatment of the facts, the imposition of provisional measures, the imposition and collection of anti-dumping duties, the duration and review of anti-dumping measures and the public disclosure of information relating to anti-dumping investigations.
D'fhonn cur i bhfeidhm leormhaith agus trédhearcach rialacha Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála 1994 áirithiú, ba cheart teanga an chomhaontaithe sin a bheith léirithe a mhéid is fearr is féidir i reachtaíocht an Aontais.
In order to ensure a proper and transparent application of the rules of the 1994 Anti-Dumping Agreement, the language of that agreement should be reflected in Union legislation to the best extent possible.
Agus rialacha Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála 1994 á gcur i bhfeidhm, tá sé fíor-riachtanach, chun cothromaíocht idir cearta agus oibleagáidí a bunaíodh leis an gComhaontú Ginearálta um Tharaifí agus Trádáil(dá ngairtear “CGTT” anseo feasta) a choimeád, go gcuirfidh an tAontas san áireamh an chaoi a léiríonn príomhpháirtithe trádála an Aontais na rialacha sin.
In applying the rules of the 1994 Anti-Dumping Agreement, it is essential, in order to maintain the balance of rights and obligations which the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’) established, that the Union take account of the interpretation of those rules by the Union's major trading partners.
Níl aon fhorálacha igComhaontú Frithdhumpála 1994 maidir le teacht timpeall ar bhearta frithdhumpála, cé gur aithin Cinneadh Aireachta CGTT ar leithligh teacht timpeall mar fhadhb agus gur cuireadh faoi bhráid Choiste Frithdhumpála CGTT é leis an gceist a réiteach.
The 1994 Anti-Dumping Agreement does not contain provisions regarding the circumvention of anti-dumping measures, though a separate GATT Ministerial Decision recognised circumvention as a problem and referred it to the GATT Anti-dumping Committee for resolution.
Dearbhaíonn na Páirtithe a gcearta agus a n-oibleagáidí faoi Airteagal VI de GATT 1994, faoin gComhaontú Frithdhumpála, faoi Chomhaontú SCM, faoi Airteagal XIX de GATT 1994, faoin gComhaontú um Choimircí, agus faoi Airteagal 5 den Chomhaontú ar Thalmhaíocht.
The Parties affirm their rights and obligations under Article VI of GATT 1994, the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the SCM Agreement, Article XIX of GATT 1994, the Safeguards Agreement, and Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
dleacht frithdhumpála, coimirce speisialta, frithchúitimh nó cosanta a chuirtear i bhfeidhm go comhsheasmhach le GATT 1994, leis an gComhaontú Frithdhumpála, leis an gComhaontú ar Thalmhaíocht, leis an gComhaontú maidir le Fóirdheontais agus Bearta Frithchúitimh nó leis an gComhaontú maidir le Bearta Cosanta, de réir mar is iomchuí;
an anti-dumping, special safeguard, countervailing or safeguard duty applied consistently with GATT 1994, the Anti-dumping Agreement, the Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures or the Agreement on Safeguards, as appropriate;
Anuas air sin, d’éiligh Airoldi gur cheart go mbeadh foráil sa bhun-Rialachán, arna léirmhíniú i bhfianaise Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála EDT, le haghaidh tréimhsí ama níos faide chun an t-imscrúdú a chur i gcrích i bhfianaise na n-imthosca.
Moreover, Airoldi claimed that the basic Regulation, interpreted in the light of the WTO Anti-dumping agreement (‘ADA’), should have provided for longer time-frames for completing the investigation in the light of the circumstances.
Rinne Rialtas na Síne an argóint gur dhearbhaigh an Comhlacht Achomhairc in EU-Biodiesel (an Airgintín) (DS473) agus an painéal in EU-Cost Adjustment Methodologies II (an Rúis)(DS494) de réir Airteagal 2.2.1.1 den Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála, fad is a bhí na taifid arna gcoinneáil ag an onnmhaireoir nó ag an táirgeoir faoi imscrúdú ar aon dul - laistigh de theorainneacha inghlactha - ar bhealach cruinn agus iontaofa, leis na costais iarbhír arna dtabhú ag an táirgeoir nó onnmhaireoir áirithe don táirge faoi imscrúdú, gur cheart don údarás imscrúdaithe an taifead sin a úsáid chun costas táirgeachta na dtáirgeoirí faoi imscrúdú a chinneadh.
The GOC argued that the Appellate Body in EU-Biodiesel (Argentina) (DS473) and the panel in EU-Cost Adjustment Methodologies II (Russia) (DS494) asserted that according to Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as long as the records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation corresponded – within acceptable limits – in an accurate and reliable manner, to all the actual costs incurred by the particular producer or exporter for the product under investigation, the investigation authority should use such record to determine the production cost of the investigated producers.
Ar an gcéad dul síos, léirigh Airoldi a thacaíocht do bharúlacha Xiamen Xiashun a tíolacadh maidir le tionscnamh a bhaineann le neamh-chomhoiriúnacht Airteagal 2(6a) den Bhunrialachán le forálacha éagsúla de chomhaontú frithdhumpála na hEagraíochta Domhanda Trádála.
First, Airoldi expressed its support for Xiamen Xiashun’s comments submitted on initiation concerning the incompatibility of Art. 2(6a) of the basic Regulation with various provisions of the WTO Anti-dumping agreement.
Ar chaoi ar bith, níl aon oibleagáid dhlíthiúil ar an gCoimisiún anailís deighleoige a dhéanamh i ngach cás ar leith, beag beann ar na himthosca fíorasacha – ní sa Bhunrialachán ná i gComhaontú Frithdhumpála na hEagraíochta Domhanda Trádála (EDT), agus níl aon ní sna tuarascálacha HP-SSST a thabharfadh le fios go raibh an Comhlacht Achomhairc i seasamh amhlaidh.
In any event, there is no legal obligation that the Commission conducts a segment analysis in each and every case, regardless of the factual circumstances – neither in the basic Regulation nor in the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement, and there is nothing in the HP-SSST reports that would suggest the Appellate Body took such a position.
Ina theannta sin, mar a luaitear in aithris (302), níl aon oibleagáid dhlíthiúil ar an gCoimisiún anailís in aghaidh na deighleoige a dhéanamh i ngach cás, beag beann ar na himthosca fíorasacha – ní sa Bhunrialachán ná i gComhaontú Frithdhumpála na hEagraíochta Domhanda Trádála (EDT) agus níl aon ní in HP-SSST a thabharfadh le fios gur ghlac an Comhlacht Achomhairc an seasamh sin.
In addition, as mentioned in recital (302), there is no legal obligation that the Commission conducts a segment analysis in each and every case, regardless of the factual circumstances – neither in the basic Regulation nor in the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement and there is nothing in HP-SSST that would suggest the Appellate Body took such a position.
Sa chéad dul síos, mhaígh CCCMC nach sainaithnítear i gComhaontú Frithdhumpála EDT (“ADA”) coincheap an tsaofa shuntasaigh in Airteagal 2.2 ADA, airteagal faoina gceadaítear ríomh an ghnáthluacha sa chás nach bhfuil aon díolachán i ngnáthchúrsa na trádála agus sa chás sin amháin.
First, CCCMC claimed that the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (‘ADA’) does not recognise the concept of significant distortions in Article 2.2 ADA, which only allows the construction of the normal value if there are no sales in the ordinary course of trade.
Is doiciméad ““Íogair” doiciméad a meastar é a bheith rúnda de bhun Airteagal 19 den bhun-Rialachán agus Airteagal 6 de Chomhaontú EDT maidir le cur chun feidhme Airteagal VI de GATT 1994 (Comhaontú Frithdhumpála).
A ‘Sensitive’ document is a document which is considered confidential pursuant to Article 19 of the basic Regulation and Article 6 of the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).
Mhaígh na páirtithe céanna nach raibh stair dhumpála i gceist, agus is rud é ar dhírigh siad aird air chuige sin cinneadh Chomhlacht um Réiteach Díospóide EDT nach bhfuil an dumpáil dhíobhálach a bunaíodh in 2009 i gcomhréir le Comhaontú frithdhumpála EDT.
The same parties claimed that there was no history of dumping pointing out that the injurious dumping established in 2009 was found to be not in line with the WTO anti-dumping Agreement by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
Is doiciméad “Íogair” doiciméad a meastar é a bheith rúnda de bhun Airteagal 19 den bhun-Rialachán agus Airteagal 6 de Chomhaontú EDT maidir le cur chun feidhme Airteagal VI de GATT 1994 (Comhaontú Frithdhumpála).
A ‘Sensitive’ document is a document which is considered confidential pursuant to Article 19 of the basic Regulation and Article 6 of the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).
Níl sé ábhartha ó thaobh an dlí de nach mbaintear úsáid as coincheap an tsaofa shuntasaigh i ndlíthe Eorpacha, ós rud é go mbaineann sé go sonrach le réimse an fhrithdhumpála, rud a rialaítear leis na rialacha faoi Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála na hEagraíochta Domhanda Trádála.
It is legally irrelevant that other European laws do not use the concept of significant distortions, since it is specific to the area of anti-dumping, which is governed by the rules under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Rinne Rialtas na Síne an argóint gur dhearbhaigh an Buanchomhlacht Achomhairc in EU-Biodiesel (an Airgintín) (DS473) agus an painéal in EU-Cost Adjustment Methodologies II (an Rúis) (DS494) de réir Airteagal 2.2.1.1 den Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála, fad is a bhí na taifid arna gcoinneáil ag an onnmhaireoir nó ag an táirgeoir faoi imscrúdú ar aon dul - laistigh de theorainneacha inghlactha - ar bhealach cruinn agus iontaofa, leis na costais arna dtabhú ag an táirgeoir nó onnmhaireoir áirithe don táirge faoi imscrúdú, gur cheart don údarás imscrúdaithe na taifid sin a úsáid chun costas táirgeachta na dtáirgeoirí faoi imscrúdú a chinneadh.
The GOC argued that the Appellate Body in EU-Biodiesel (Argentina) (DS473) and the panel in EU-Cost Adjustment Methodologies II (Russia) (DS494) asserted that according to Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as long as the records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation corresponded – within acceptable limits – in an accurate and reliable manner, to all the actual costs incurred by the particular producer or exporter for the product under investigation, the investigation authority should use such records to determine the production cost of the investigated producers.
Ar an tríú dul síos, dúirt Xiamen Xiashun, agus d’athdhearbhaigh sé arís tar éis an nochtadh cinntitheach a dhéanamh, go dtugann an Coimisiún neamhaird go córasach ar chostais saothair tháirgeoirí onnmhairiúcháin na Síne, is cruthúnas é sin nach bhfuil Airteagal 2(6a) den bhun-Rialachán ag luí le hAirteagal 2.2, Airteagal 2.2.1.1. agus Airteagal 2.2.2. de Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála na hEagraíochta Domhanda Trádála.
Third, Xiamen Xiashun commented, and reiterated following definitive disclosure, that the fact that the Commission systematically disregards the labour costs of the Chinese exporting producers, proves that Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation is incompatible with Article 2.2, Article 2.2.1.1 and Article 2.2.2 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (‘ADA’).
D’áitigh Ketong nach luíonn an mhodheolaíocht a fhorordaítear le hAirteagal 2(6a) den bhun-Rialachán chun críche an gnáthluach a bhunú le Prótacal maidir le hAontachas na Síne leis an Eagraíocht Dhomhanda Trádála (EDT), le Comhaontú Frithdhumpála EDT, agus leis an rialú ó Chomhlacht Réiteach Díospóide EDT, agus nár cheart iad a chur chun feidhme, dá bhrí sin.
Ketong argued that the methodology prescribed by Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation for the purpose of establishing the normal value is incompatible with China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO, the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (‘ADA’), and WTO Dispute Settlement Body (‘DSB’) ruling, and should thus not be applied.
Mhaígh Shenghua maidir le ráiteas an Choimisiúin, nár luadh in aon áit sna critéir roghnúcháin a leagtar amach sa bhun-Rialachán nach mór praghsanna na bhfóntas a bheith laistigh de raon ar leith go roghnófaí tír mar thír ionadaíoch mar a luaitear in aithris (97) agus nach raibh sé sin i gcomhréir leis an mbun-Rialachán ná le Comhaontú Frithdhumpála EDT, lena gceanglaítear, fiú i gcás ina gcinnfidh an Coimisiún gan praghsanna díola nó costais na gcuideachtaí sa tír thionscnaimh a úsáid, gur cheart dó sonraí athsholáthair réasúnacha a úsáid chun gnáthluach a shuí.
Shenghua claimed that the Commission statement that nowhere in the criteria for selection set out in the basic Regulation was mentioned that the prices of utilities have to be within a certain range for a country to be selected as representative country as stated in recital (97) was not in line with the basic Regulation and the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement, which requires that even if the Commission decides not to use the sales prices or costs of the companies in the country of origin, it should use reasonable replacement data for establishing normal value.
Mhaígh sé nár chomhlíon an gearán ceanglais Airteagal 5.2 den Chomhaontú Frithdhumpála mar (1) bhí easpa fianaise leordhóthanach ann de dhumpáil le linn na tréimhse faoi bhreathnú, (2) rinne sé measúnú ar éifeachtaí na n-allmhairí ó SAM agus ó Ríocht na hAraibe Sádaí go carnach gan údar cuí, (3) theip air measúnú a dhéanamh go hoibiachtúil ar dhíobháil ábhartha a bheith ann mar go raibh forluí idir an tréimhse imscrúdaithe agus an bhliain féilire roimhe sin, agus (4) níor chuir an gearánach fianaise ar fáil maidir le nasc cúisíoch a bheith ann.
It claimed that the complaint did not satisfy the requirements of Article 5.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement (‘ADA’) as (1) it lacked sufficient evidence of dumping during the period considered, (2) it assessed the effects of imports from the US and the KSA cumulatively without proper justification, (3) it failed to assess the existence of material injury objectively as the investigation period overlapped with the previous calendar year, and (4) the complainant had not provided evidence of a causal link.