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Ítimí de chuid an CWC (An Coinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha)
Items of the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention)
Ítimí de chuid an CWC (An Coinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha)
Items of the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention)
Ítimí CWC (An Coinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha)
Items of the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention)
Tá tuilleadh eolais le fáil ar: https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention
Further information is available at: https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention
Ítimí CWC (An Coinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha)
Items of the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention)
Glacadh ar láimh na gealltanais sin i gcomhthéacs rannpháirtíochta i nGrúpa na hAstráile, sa Chóras um Rialú na Teicneolaíochta Diúracán, i nGrúpa na Soláthraithe Núicléacha, i gComhshocraíocht Wassenaar agus sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha.
These commitments were undertaken within the context of participation in the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Leis an liosta seo, cuirtear chun feidhme rialuithe dé-úsáide arna gcomhaontú go hidirnáisiúnta, lena n-áirítear Comhshocraíocht Wassenaar, an Córas um Rialú na Teicneolaíochta Diúracán (MTCR), Grúpa na Soláthróirí Ábhar Núicléach (NSG), Grúpa na hAstráile agus an Coinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha (CWC).
This list implements internationally agreed dual-use controls including the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), the Australia Group and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Leis an liosta seo, cuirtear chun feidhme rialuithe dé-úsáide arna gcomhaontú go hidirnáisiúnta, lena náirítear Comhshocraíocht Wassenaar, an Córas um Rialú na Teicneolaíochta Diúracán (MTCR), Grúpa na Soláthróirí Ábhar Núicléach (NSG), Grúpa na hAstráile agus an Coinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha (CWC).
This list implements internationally agreed dual-use controls including the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), the Australia Group and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Leagtar béim i Straitéis an Aontais ar an ról ríthábhachtach atá ag an gCoinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha (CWC) agus ag OPCW i ndáil le hairm cheimiceacha a dhíothú ón saol.
The EU Strategy underlines the crucial role of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and of the OPCW in creating a world free of chemical weapons.
Glactar cinntí maidir leis na hítimí atá faoi réir rialuithe faoi chuimsiú Ghrúpa na hAstráile, an Chórais Rialaithe Teicneolaíochta Diúracán (MTCR), Ghrúpa na Soláthraithe Núicléacha (NSG), Chomhshocraíocht Wassenaar agus Chomhdháil na nArm Ceimiceacha (CWC).
Decisions on the items subject to controls are taken within the framework of the Australia Group (AG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Glactar cinntí maidir leis na hítimí atá faoi réir rialaithe faoi chuimsiú Ghrúpa na hAstráile, an Chórais Rialaithe um Theicneolaíocht Diúracán, Ghrúpa na Soláthraithe Núicléacha, Chomhshocraíocht Wassenaar agus Choinbhinsiún na nArm Ceimiceach.
Decisions on the items subject to controls are taken within the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig “Stáit nach páirtí iad sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha”, ní rialaítear le 1C350 “meascáin cheimiceacha” ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C350.1,.3,.5,.11,.12,.13,.17,.18,.21,.22,.26,.27,.28,.31,.32,.33,.34,.35,.36,.54,.55,.56,.57 agus.63 nach mó ná 10 % de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith atá sonraithe.
For exports to “States not Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention”, 1C350 does not control “chemical mixtures” containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C350.1,.3,.5,.11,.12,.13,.17,. 18,.21,.22,.26,.27,.28,.31,.32,.33,.34,.35,.36,.54,.55,.56,.57 and.63 in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 10 % by the weight of the mixture.
Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig “Stáit ar páirtí iad sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha”, ní rialaítear le 1C350 “meascáin cheimiceacha” ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C350.1,.3,.5,.11,.12,.13,.17,.18,.21,.22,.26,.27,.28,.31,.32,.33,.34,.35,.36,.54,.55,.56,.57 agus.63 nach mó ná 30 % de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith atá sonraithe.
For exports to “States Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention”, 1C350 does not control “chemical mixtures” containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C350.1,.3,.5,.11,.12,.13,.17,. 18,.21,.22,.26,.27,.28,.31,.32,.33,.34,.35,.36,.54,.55,.56,.57 and.63 in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 30 % by the weight of the mixture.
Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig “Stáit nach Páirtithe iad sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha”, ní rialaítear le 1C450 “meascáin cheimiceacha” ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C450.a.1. agus.a.2. nach mó ná 1 % de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith dá bhfuil sonraithe.
For exports to “States not Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention”, 1C450 does not control “chemical mixtures” containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C450.a.1. and.a.2. in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 1 % by the weight of the mixture.
Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig “Stáit ar Páirtithe iad sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha”, ní rialaítear le 1C450 “meascáin cheimiceacha” ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C450.a.1. agus.a.2. nach mó ná 30 % de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith dá bhfuil sonraithe.
For exports to “States Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention”, 1C450 does not control “chemical mixtures” containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C450.a.1. and.a.2. in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 30 % by the weight of the mixture.
Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig “Stáit nach páirtí iad sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha”, ní rialaítear le 1C450 “meascáin cheimiceacha” ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C450.b.1.,.b.2.,.b.3.,.b.4.,.b.5. agus.b.6. nach mó ná 10 % de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith atá sonraithe.
For exports to “States not Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention”, 1C450 does not control “chemical mixtures” containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C450.b.1.,.b.2.,.b.3.,.b.4.,.b.5. and.b.6. in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 10 % by the weight of the mixture.
Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig “Stáit nach páirtí iad sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha”, ní rialaítear le 1C450 “meascáin cheimiceacha” ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C450.b.1.,.b.2.,.b.3.,.b.4.,.b.5. agus.b.6.nach mó ná 30 % de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith atá sonraithe.
For exports to “States Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention”, 1C450 does not control “chemical mixtures” containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C450.b.1.,.b.2.,.b.3.,.b.4.,.b.5. and.b.6. in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 30 % by the weight of the mixture.
Glactar cinntí maidir leis na hítimí atá faoi réir rialaithe faoi chuimsiú Ghrúpa na hAstráile, an Chórais Rialaithe um Theicneolaíocht Diúracán, Ghrúpa na Soláthraithe Núicléacha, Chomhshocraíocht Wassenaar agus Choinbhinsiún na nArm Ceimiceach.
Decisions on the items subject to controls are taken within the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Related materials are materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. ð Tá sé de cheangal rialuithe a dhéanamh freisin faoi chomhaontuithe idirnáisiúnta ábhartha, amhail an Coinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha agus an Coinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Bhitheolaíocha agus Tocsaine, agus i gcomhréir leis na gealltanais arna gcomhaontú i gcórais rialaithe onnmhairiúcháin iltaobhacha. ï
Related materials are materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. ð Controls are also required under relevant international agreements, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and in line with commitments agreed upon in multilateral export control regimes. ï
Nóta 1:Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig “Stáit nach páirtí iad sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha”, ní rialaítear le 1C350 “meascáin cheimiceacha” ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C350.1,.3,.5,.11,.12,.13,.17,.18,.21,.22,.26,.27,.28,.31,.32,.33,.34,.35,.36,.54,.55,.56,.57 agus.63 nach mó ná 10 % de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith atá sonraithe.
Note 1:For exports to "States not Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention", 1C350 does not control "chemical mixtures" containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C350.1,.3,.5,.11,.12,.13,.17,.18,.21,.22,.26,.27,.28,.31,.32,.33,.34,.35,.36,.54,.55,.56,.57 and.63 in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 10 % by the weight of the mixture.
Nóta 2:Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig “Stáit ar páirtí iad sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha”, ní rialaítear le 1C350 “meascáin cheimiceacha” ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C350.1,.3,.5,.11,.12,.13,.17,.18,.21,.22,.26,.27,.28,.31,.32,.33,.34,.35,.36,.54,.55,.56,.57 agus.63 nach mó ná 30 % de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith atá sonraithe.
Note 2:For exports to "States Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention", 1C350 does not control "chemical mixtures" containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C350.1,.3,.5,.11,.12,.13,.17,.18,.21,.22,.26,.27,.28,.31,.32,.33,.34,.35,.36,.54,.55,.56,.57 and.63 in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 30 % by the weight of the mixture.
Nóta 1:Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig “Stáit nach Páirtithe iad sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha”, ní rialaítear le 1C450 “meascáin cheimiceacha” ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C450.b.1.,.b.2.,.b.3.,.b.4.,.b.5. agus.b.6. nach mó ná 10 % de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith dá bhfuil sonraithe.
Note 1:For exports to "States not Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention", 1C450 does not control "chemical mixtures" containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C450.b.1.,.b.2.,.b.3.,.b.4.,.b.5. and.b.6. in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 10 % by the weight of the mixture.
Nóta 2:Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig “Stáit ar Páirtithe iad sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha”, ní rialaítear le 1C450 “meascáin cheimiceacha” ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C450.b.1.,.b.2.,.b.3.,.b.4.,.b.5. agus.b.6. nach mó ná 30 % de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith dá bhfuil sonraithe.
Note 2:For exports to "States Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention", 1C450 does not control "chemical mixtures" containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C450.b.1.,.b.2.,.b.3.,.b.4.,.b.5. and.b.6. in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 30 % by the weight of the mixture.
Nóta 1:Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig “Stáit nach Páirtithe iad sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha”, ní rialaítear le 1C450 “meascáin cheimiceacha” ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C450.a.agus.a.nach mó ná 1 % de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith dá bhfuil sonraithe.
Note 1:For exports to "States not Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention", 1C450 does not control "chemical mixtures" containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C450.a.and.a.in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 1 % by the weight of the mixture.
Nóta 2:Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig “Stáit ar Páirtithe iad sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha”, ní rialaítear le 1C450 “meascáin cheimiceacha” ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C450.a.agus.a.nach mó ná 30 % de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith dá bhfuil sonraithe.
Note 2:For exports to "States Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention", 1C450 does not control "chemical mixtures" containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C450.a.and.a.in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 30 % by the weight of the mixture.
I bhfianaise a róil shinsearaigh ceannaireachta san Oifig sin, tá Andrei Yarin freagrach, dá bhrí sin, as tacaíocht a spreagadh agus a chur ar fáil do na daoine sin a nimhigh Alexei Navalny nó a raibh baint acu lena nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg Novichok, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha.
Given his senior leadership role in that Office, Andrei Yarin is therefore responsible for inducing and providing support to the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
I bhfianaise a róil shinsearaigh ceannaireachta san Oifig sin, tá Sergei Kiriyenko freagrach, dá bhrí sin, as tacaíocht a spreagadh agus a chur ar fáil do na daoine sin a nimhigh Alexei Navalny nó a raibh baint acu lena nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg Novichok, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha.
Given his senior leadership role in that Office, Sergei Kiriyenko is therefore responsible for inducing and providing support to the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
I bhfianaise a róil shinsearaigh ceannaireachta san Oifig sin in Siberian Federal District, tá Sergei Menyailo freagrach, dá bhrí sin, as tacaíocht a spreagadh agus a chur ar fáil do na daoine sin a nimhigh Alexei Navalny nó a raibh baint acu lena nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg Novichok, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha.
Given his senior leadership role as the representative of that Office in the Siberian Federal District, Sergei Menyailo is therefore responsible for inducing and providing support to the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
I bhfianaise a róil shinsearaigh ceannaireachta sa Federal Security Service, tá Aleksandr Bortnikov freagrach, dá bhrí sin, as tacaíocht a chur ar fáil do na daoine sin a nimhnigh Alexei Navalny nó a raibh baint acu lena nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg Novichok, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha.
Given his senior leadership role in the Federal Security Service, Aleksandr Bortnikov is therefore responsible for providing support to the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
I bhfianaise a róil shinsearaigh ceannaireachta in Aireacht Cosanta Chónaidhm na Rúise, tá Pavel Popov freagrach, dá bhrí sin, as cúnamh a thabhairt do na daoine sin a nimhigh Alexei Navalny nó a raibh baint acu lena nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg Novichok, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha.
Given his senior leadership role in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Pavel Popov is therefore responsible for assisting the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
I bhfianaise a róil shinsearaigh ceannaireachta in Aireacht Cosanta Chónaidhm na Rúise, tá Aleksei Krivoruchko freagrach, dá bhrí sin, as cúnamh a thabhairt do na daoine sin a nimhigh Alexei Navalny nó a raibh baint acu lena nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg Novichok, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha.
Given his senior leadership role in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Aleksei Krivoruchko is therefore responsible for assisting the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
I bhfianaise a róil shinsearaigh ceannaireachta san Oifig sin, tá Andrei Yarin freagrach, dá bhrí sin, as tacaíocht a spreagadh agus a chur ar fáil do na daoine sin a nimhigh Alexei Navalny nó a raibh baint acu lena nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg Novichok, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha.
Given his senior leadership role in that Office, Andrei Yarin is therefore responsible for inducing and providing support to the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
I bhfianaise a róil shinsearaigh ceannaireachta san Oifig sin, tá Sergei Kiriyenko freagrach, dá bhrí sin, as tacaíocht a spreagadh agus a chur ar fáil do na daoine sin a nimhigh Alexei Navalny nó a raibh baint acu lena nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg Novichok, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha.
Given his senior leadership role in that Office, Sergei Kiriyenko is therefore responsible for inducing and providing support to the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
I bhfianaise a róil shinsearaigh ceannaireachta san Oifig sin in Siberian Federal District, tá Sergei Menyailo freagrach, dá bhrí sin, as tacaíocht a spreagadh agus a chur ar fáil do na daoine sin a nimhigh Alexei Navalny nó a raibh baint acu lena nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg Novichok, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha.
Given his senior leadership role as the representative of that Office in the Siberian Federal District, Sergei Menyailo is therefore responsible for inducing and providing support to the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
I bhfianaise a róil shinsearaigh ceannaireachta sa Federal Security Service, tá Aleksandr Bortnikov freagrach, dá bhrí sin, as tacaíocht a chur ar fáil do na daoine sin a nimhnigh Alexei Navalny nó a raibh baint acu lena nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg Novichok, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha.
Given his senior leadership role in the Federal Security Service, Aleksandr Bortnikov is therefore responsible for providing support to the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
I bhfianaise a róil shinsearaigh ceannaireachta in Aireacht Cosanta Chónaidhm na Rúise, tá Pavel Popov freagrach, dá bhrí sin, as cúnamh a thabhairt do na daoine sin a nimhigh Alexei Navalny nó a raibh baint acu lena nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg Novichok, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha.
Given his senior leadership role in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Pavel Popov is therefore responsible for assisting the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
I bhfianaise a róil shinsearaigh ceannaireachta in Aireacht Cosanta Chónaidhm na Rúise, tá Aleksei Krivoruchko freagrach, dá bhrí sin, as cúnamh a thabhairt do na daoine sin a nimhigh Alexei Navalny nó a raibh baint acu lena nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg Novichok, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha.
Given his senior leadership role in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Aleksei Krivoruchko is therefore responsible for assisting the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Ina theannta sin, tionólfar imeacht sa Ghinéiv ag a dtabharfar le chéile NCPanna uile BTWC, mar shampla roimh Chruinniú BTWC na Stát is Páirtithe, le go bhféadfar malartú faisnéise agus líonrú a dhéanamh i measc na NCPanna ó na réigiúin éagsúla, cosúil le Cruinniú Bliantúil na nÚdarás Náisiúnta OPCW faoin gCoinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha.
Furthermore, an event will be held in Geneva bringing together all BTWC NCPs, for example before the BTWC Meeting of States Parties, to allow for the exchange of information and networking among the NCPs across regions, similar to the OPCW’s Annual Meeting of National Authorities under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Cé nach iad na híomhánna satailíte an t-aon fhoinse faisnéise fianaiseach, tig leo táscairí agus comhthacaíocht a sholáthar nach bhfuil le fáil i bhfoinsí eile, rud a thugann léargais anailíseacha luachmhara is féidir a úsáid chun cur chun feidhme iomlán an Choinbhinsiúin um Airm Cheimiceacha (CWC) a áirithiú.
Satellite imagery, while not the only source of evidentiary information, can provide indicators and corroboration not available from other sources thus providing valuable analytical insights that can be used to ensure the full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Tá gá le rialuithe freisin faoi chomhaontuithe idirnáisiúnta ábhartha, amhail an Coinbhinsiún maidir le Toirmeasc ar Fhorbairt, Táirgeadh, Stoc-Charnadh agus Úsáid Arm Ceimiceach agus maidir lena nDíothú (‘Coinbhinsiún na nArm Ceimiceach’ nó ‘CWC’) agus an Coinbhinsiún maidir le Toirmeasc ar Fhorbairt, Táirgeadh agus Stoc-Charnadh Arm Baictéareolaíochta (Bitheolaíocht) agus Tocsaine agus maidir lena nDíothú (an Coinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Bhitheolaíocha agus Thocsaine’ nó ‘BWC’) agus i gcomhréir le gealltanais arna gcomhaontú i gcórais iltaobhacha rialaithe onnmhairí.
Controls are also required under relevant international agreements, such as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (the ‘Chemical Weapons Convention’ or ‘CWC’) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and On Their Destruction (the ‘Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention’ or ‘BWC’), and in line with commitments agreed upon in multilateral export control regimes.
Le liosta na n-ítimí dé-úsáide atá san Iarscríbhinn seo, cuirtear chun feidhme rialuithe dé-úsáide arna gcomhaontú go hidirnáisiúnta, lena n-áirítear Grúpa na hAstráile, an Córas um Rialú na Teicneolaíochta Diúracán (MTCR), Grúpa na Soláthróirí Ábhar Núicléach (NSG), Comhshocraíocht Wassenaaragus agus an Coinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha (CWC).
The list of dual-use items contained in this Annex implements internationally agreed dual-use controls, including the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig ‘Stáit nach Páirtithe iad sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha’, ní rialaítear le 1C350 ‘meascáin cheimiceacha’ ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C350.1, .3, .5, .11, .12, .13, .17, .18, .21, .22, .26, .27, .28, .31, .32, .33, .34, .35, .36, .54, .55, .56, .57, .63 agus .65 nach mó ná 10 % de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith atá sonraithe.
For exports to "States not Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention", 1C350 does not control "chemical mixtures" containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C350.1, .3, .5, .11, .12, .13, .17, .18, .21, .22, .26, .27, .28, .31, .32, .33, .34, .35, .36, .54, .55, .56, .57, .63 and .65 in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 10% by the weight of the mixture.
Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig ‘Stáit ar Páirtithe iad den Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha’, ní rialaítear le 1C350 ‘meascáin cheimiceacha’ ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C350.1, .3, .5, .11, .12, .13, .17, .18, .21, .22, .26, .27, .28, .31, .32, .33, .34, .35, .36, .54, .55, .56, .57, 63 agus .65 nach mó ná 30 % de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith atá sonraithe.
For exports to "States Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention", 1C350 does not control "chemical mixtures" containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C350.1, .3, .5, .11, .12, .13, .17, .18, .21, .22, .26, .27, .28, .31, .32, .33, .34, .35, .36, .54, .55, .56, .57, .63 and .65 in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 30% by the weight of the mixture.
Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig ‘Stáit nach Páirtithe iad sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha’, ní rialaítear le 1C450 ‘meascáin cheimiceacha’ ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C450.a.1. agus .a.2. nach mó ná 1% de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith dá bhfuil sonraithe.
For exports to "States not Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention", 1C450 does not control "chemical mixtures" containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C450.a.1. and .a.2. in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 1% by the weight of the mixture.
Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig ‘Stáit nach Páirtithe iad sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha’, ní rialaítear le 1C450 ‘meascáin cheimiceacha’ ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C450.a.1. agus .a.2. nach mó ná 30 % de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith atá sonraithe.
For exports to "States Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention", 1C450 does not control "chemical mixtures" containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C450.a.1. and .a.2. in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 30% by the weight of the mixture.
Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig ‘Stáit nach Páirtithe iad sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha’, ní rialaítear le 1C450 ‘meascáin cheimiceacha’ ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C450.b.1., .b.2., .b.3., .b.4., .b.5. agus .b.6. nach mó ná 10 % de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith atá sonraithe.
For exports to "States not Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention", 1C450 does not control "chemical mixtures" containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C450.b.1., .b.2., .b.3., .b.4., .b.5. and .b.6. in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 10% by the weight of the mixture.
Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig ‘Stáit nach Páirtithe iad sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha’, ní rialaítear le 1C450 ‘meascáin cheimiceacha’ ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C450.b.1., .b.2., .b.3., .b.4., .b.5. agus .b.6 .nach mó ná 30 % de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith atá sonraithe.
For exports to "States Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention", 1C450 does not control "chemical mixtures" containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C450.b.1., .b.2., .b.3., .b.4., .b.5. and .b.6. in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 30% by the weight of the mixture.
Cinntí maidir leis na hítimí atá faoi réir rialuithe, is cinntí iad a dhéantar faoi chuimsiú na rialuithe ar ítimí dé-úsáide arna gcomhaontú go hidirnáisiúnta, lena n-áirítear Grúpa na hAstráile, an Córas Rialaithe um Theicneolaíocht Diúracán, Grúpa na Soláthraithe Núicléacha, Comhshocraíocht Wassenaar agus an Coinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha.
Decisions on the items subject to controls are taken within the framework of internationally agreed dual-use controls including the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Is é is aidhm don Choinbhinsiún maidir le Toirmeasc ar Fhorbairt, Táirgeadh, Stoc-Charnadh agus Úsáid Arm Ceimiceach agus maidir lena nDíothú (an Coinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha nó CWC), deireadh a chur le catagóir iomlán arm ollscriosta trí thoirmeasc a chur ar Pháirtithe Stáit airm cheimiceacha a fhorbairt, a tháirgeadh, a fháil, a stoc-charnadh, a choimeád, a aistriú nó a úsáid.
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC) aims to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction by prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of chemical weapons by States Parties.
Le liosta na n-ítimí dé-úsáide atá san Iarscríbhinn seo, cuirtear chun feidhme rialuithe dé-úsáide arna gcomhaontú go hidirnáisiúnta, lena n-áirítear Grúpa na hAstráile, an Córas Rialaithe um Theicneolaíocht Diúracán (MTCR), Grúpa na Soláthraithe Núicléach (NSG), Comhshocraíocht Wassenaar agus an Coinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha (CWC).
The list of dual-use items contained in this Annex implements internationally agreed dual-use controls including the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Le haghaidh onnmhairí chuig ‘Stáit nach Páirtithe iad sa Choinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha’, ní rialaítear le 1C350 ‘meascáin cheimiceacha’ ina bhfuil ceann amháin nó níos mó de na ceimiceáin atá sonraithe in iontrálacha 1C350.1, .3, .5, .11, .12, .13, .17, .18, .21, .22, .26, .27, .28, .31, .32, .33, .34, .35, .36, .54, .55, .56, .57, .63 agus .65 nach mó ná 10 % de réir mheáchan an mheascáin aon cheimiceán ar leith atá sonraithe.
For exports to "States not Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention", 1C350 does not control "chemical mixtures" containing one or more of the chemicals specified in entries 1C350.1, .3, .5, .11, .12, .13, .17, .18, .21, .22, .26, .27, .28, .31, .32, .33, .34, .35, .36, .54, .55, .56, .57, .63 and .65 in which no individually specified chemical constitutes more than 10 % by the weight of the mixture.