#2701739
Forchur cúlghabhálach beart frithdhumpála
Retroactive imposition of anti-dumping measures
Forchur cúlghabhálach beart frithdhumpála
Retroactive imposition of anti-dumping measures
maidir le bearta a fhéadfaidh an tAontas a dhéanamh i ndáil le héifeacht chomhcheangailte beart frithdhumpála nó frith fhóirdheontais agus beart cosanta
on measures that the Union may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures
Beidh feidhm ag beart frithdhumpála chomh fada, agus a mhéid, a bhfuil gá leis chun gníomhú in aghaidh na dumpála is cúis díobhála.
An anti-dumping measure shall remain in force only as long as, and to the extent that, it is necessary to counteract the dumping which is causing injury.
Tháinig an Cuibhreannas ar an gconclúid go dtiocfadh ganntanas soláthair HRFS san Aontas as forchur beart frithdhumpála agus, dá bhrí sin, go mbeadh sé in aghaidh leas úsáideoirí neamhspleácha HRFS ón Aontas.
The Consortium concluded that the imposition of anti-dumping measures would lead to a shortage of supply of HRFS in the Union and that it would thus be against the interest of Union independent users of HRFS.
Ní dhearnadh aon chinneadh maidir le cur i bhfeidhm féideartha cúlghabhálach beart frithdhumpála ag an gcéim seo den nós imeachta.
No decision on a possible retroactive application of anti-dumping measures has been taken at this stage of the proceeding.
Rinne na tíortha sin méadú níos mó ná 1.5 mhilliún tona ar a n-allmhairí HRFS idir an tréimhse roimh fhorchur beart frithdhumpála, i.e. roimh 2016, agus an tréimhse imscrúdaithe.
These countries increased by over 1.5 million tonnes their imports of HRFS between the period prior to the imposition of anti-dumping measures, i.e. before 2016, and the investigation period.
Fógra maidir le dul in éag beart frithdhumpála áirithe atá le tarlú (IO C 18, 20.1.2020, lch. 20).
Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures (OJ C 18, 20.1.2020, p. 20).
Fógra maidir le dul in éag beart frithdhumpála áirithe atá le tarlú (IO C 322, 26.9.2019, lch. 5).
Notice of the impending expiry of the anti-dumping measures (OJ C 322, 26.9.2019, p. 5).
Fógra maidir le dul in éag beart frithdhumpála áirithe atá ar tí tarlú (IO C 35, 3.2.2020, lch. 3).
Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures (OJ C 35, 3.2.2020, p. 3).
Dá bhrí sin, mheas an Coimisiún go bhféadfadh sé go mbeadh tionchar, cé gur tionchar teoranta a bheadh ann, ag forchur beart frithdhumpála ar thorthaí allmhaireoirí an Aontais.
The Commission therefore considered that the imposition of anti-dumping measures might have an impact, although limited, on the results of the Union importers.
Fógra maidir le dul in éag beart frithdhumpála áirithe atá le tarlú (IO C 40, 6.2.2020, lch. 34).
Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures (OJ C 40, 6.2.2020, p. 34).
Fógra maidir le dul in éag beart frithdhumpála áirithe atá le tarlú (IO C 46, 11.2.2020, lch. 8).
Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures (OJ C 46, 11.2.2020, p. 8).
Fógra maidir le dul in éag beart frithdhumpála áirithe atá le tarlú (IO C 210, 24.6.2020, lch. 29).
Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures (OJ C 210, 24.6.2020, p. 29).
In éagmais an chomhair, tugtar le fios nach measann allmhaireoirí go ndéanfadh forchur beart frithdhumpála difear mór dá gcuid gnó.
The absence of cooperation suggests that importers do not consider that the imposition of anti-dumping measures would significantly affect their business.
Fógra maidir le dul in éag beart frithdhumpála áirithe atá le tarlú (IO C 209, 2.6.2021, lch. 24).
Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures (OJ C 209, 2.6.2021, p. 24).
Ina theannta sin, ní choisctear forchur beart frithdhumpála laistigh de chuótaí dleachta saor ó choimirce trí na bearta coimirce.
In addition, the steel safeguard measures do not prevent the imposition of anti-dumping measures within the free-of-safeguard duty quotas.
Ar an mbonn sin, thángthas ar an gconclúid shealadach gur dócha nach mbeadh tionchar diúltach ag forchur beart frithdhumpála ar staid na n-allmhaireoirí san Aontas.
On this basis, it has been provisionally concluded that the imposition of anti-dumping measures is not likely to have a negative effect on the situation of importers in the Union.
DS337: Comhphobail Eorpacha — Beart Frithdhumpála maidir le Bradán Saothraithe ón Iorua, mír. 7.275.
DS337: European Communities – Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway, para. 7.275.
Ní dhéanfar na socruithe fabhracha dá bhforáiltear sa Rialachán seo a aistarraingt faoi phointe (d) de mhír 1 maidir le táirgí atá faoi réir beart frithdhumpála nó frithchúitimh faoi Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 597/2009 ón gComhairle an 11 Meitheamh 2009 maidir le cosaint i gcoinne allmhairí fóirdheontais ó thíortha nach baill den Chomhphobal Eorpach iad [10], nó Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 1225/2009 ón gComhairle an 30 Samhain 2009 maidir le cosaint i gcoinne allmhairí dumpáilte ó thíortha nach baill den Chomhphobal Eorpach iad [11], ar na cúiseanna a thugann údar maith leis na bearta sin.
The preferential arrangements provided for in this Regulation shall not be withdrawn under point (d) of paragraph 1 in respect of products that are subject to anti-dumping or countervailing measures under Council Regulation (EC) No 597/2009 of 11 June 2009 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Community [10] or Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community [11], for the reasons justifying those measures.
Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 452/2003 ón gComhairle an 6 Márta 2003 maidir le bearta a fhéadfaidh an Comhphobal a ghlacadh i ndáil le héifeacht chomhcheangailte beart frithdhumpála nó frith-fhóirdheontais agus beart cosanta (IO L 69, 13.3.2003, lch. 8).
Council Regulation (EC) No 452/2003 of 6 March 2003 on measures that the Community may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures (OJ L 69, 13.3.2003, p. 8).
Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 452/2003 ón gComhairle an 6 Márta 2003 maidir le bearta a fhéadfaidh an Comhphobal a dhéanamh i ndáil le héifeacht chomhcheangailte beart frithdhumpála nó frith-fhóirdheontais agus beart cosanta (IO L 69, 13.3.2003, lch. 8).
Council Regulation (EC) No 452/2003 of 6 March 2003 on measures that the Community may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures (OJ L 69, 13.3.2003, p. 8).
I gcás cleachtais ar dóchúil gur gá don Aontas na bearta dá bhforáiltear in Airteagal 23(2) den Chomhaontú Eatramhach, agus in Airteagal 38(2) den CCC ina dhiaidh sin, a chur i bhfeidhm ina leith, déanfar tabhairt isteach beart frithdhumpála agus/nó frithchúitimh a chinneadh i gcomhréir leis na forálacha a leagtar síos i Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 1225/2009 agus/nó i Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 597/2009 faoi seach.
In the event of a practice which is liable to warrant application by the Union of the measures provided for in Article 23(2) of the Interim Agreement, and thereafter Article 38(2) of the SAA, the introduction of anti-dumping and/or countervailing measures shall be decided upon in accordance with the provisions laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 and/or Regulation (EC) No 597/2009, respectively.
I gcás cleachtas ar dóchúil gur gá don Aontas na bearta dá bhforáiltear in Airteagal 36(1) de CCC a chur i bhfeidhm ina leith, déanfar tabhairt isteach beart frithdhumpála a chinneadh i gcomhréir leis na forálacha a leagtar síos i Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 1225/2009 ón gComhairle (8) agus an nós imeachta dá bhforáiltear in Airteagal 36(2) de CCC.
In the event of a practice which is liable to warrant application by the Union of the measures provided for in Article 36(1) of the SAA, the introduction of anti-dumping measures shall be decided upon in accordance with the provisions laid down in Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (8) and the procedure provided for in Article 36(2) of the SAA.
Rachaidh beart frithdhumpála cinntitheach in éag cúig bliana ón dáta a fhorchuirfear é nó cúig bliana ón dáta a dhéanfar cinneadh maidir leis an athbhreithniú is déanaí a cumhdóidh dumpáil agus díobháil, ach amháin má chinntear in athbhreithniú gur dhócha go leanfaí le dumpáil agus díobháil nó go gcuirfí tús leo arís mar thoradh ar dhul in éag an bhirt.
A definitive anti-dumping measure shall expire five years from its imposition or five years from the date of the conclusion of the most recent review which has covered both dumping and injury, unless it is determined in a review that the expiry would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.
I bhfianaise thábhacht na n-allmhairí ón Tuirc i ngníomhaíochtaí HRFS Network Steel S.L., mheas an Coimisiún go mb’fhéidir go mbeadh tionchar, bíodh sé teoranta, ag forchur beart frithdhumpála íseal ar a thorthaí i gcás ina gcoimeádfadh an páirtí a mheascán soláthróirí reatha.
Given the significance of Turkish imports in the HRFS activities of Network Steel S.L., the Commission considered that the imposition of low anti-dumping measures might have an impact, although very limited, on its results should the party keep its current suppliers mix.
Ar deireadh, thug an Coimisiún dá aire freisin nach bhfágann forchur beart frithdhumpála as féin go dtiocfaidh deireadh leis na hallmhairí ón tionscnamh lena mbaineann, nó fiú go dtiocfaidh laghdú orthu ar bhealach fóinteach, ach go ndéanfaí iad a allmhairiú ar phraghsanna cothroma.
Lastly, the Commission also noted that as such, the imposition of anti-dumping measures does not mean that imports from the origin concerned will cease, or even that they will decrease in a meaningful way, but simply that they would be imported at fair prices.
Faoi mar a d’admhaigh an Cuibhreannas, le forchur beart frithdhumpála, níor cuireadh cosc le hallmhairí ón Rúis a bheith á dtabhairt isteach i margadh an Aontais i méideanna ábhartha (ba í an dara tír onnmhairiúcháin ba mhó í le linn na tréimhse imscrúdaithe), agus leanadh d’allmhairí ón mBrasaíl agus ón Úcráin a thabhairt isteach i margadh an Aontais, bíodh is go raibh cainníochtaí is lú díobh ann.
As acknowledged by the Consortium, the imposition of anti-dumping measures did not prevent Russian imports from entering the Union market in relevant amounts (it was the second largest exporting country in the investigation period), and imports from Brazil and Ukraine continued entering the Union market, albeit in smaller quantities.
Maidir leis sin, rinne an Coimisiún measúnú ar fhorás allmhairí HRFS isteach san Aontas de réir tionscnaimh, ag tosú i dtréimhse roimh an mborradh a tháinig faoi allmhairí dumpáilte (blianta 2013-2014) as ar tháinig glacadh beart frithdhumpála, in 2016 agus 2017 faoi seach.
In this respect the Commission assessed the evolution of imports of HRFS into the Union by origin starting in a period prior to the surge of dumped imports (years 2013-2014) that lead to the adoption of anti-dumping measures, in 2016 and 2017 respectively.
Rialachán (AE) 2015/477 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle an 11 Márta 2015 maidir le bearta a fhéadfaidh an tAontas a dhéanamh i ndáil le héifeacht chomhcheangailte beart frithdhumpála nó frith fhóirdheontais agus beart cosanta
Regulation (EU) 2015/477 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on measures that the Union may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures
Fógraí maidir le dul in éag beart frithdhumpála áirithe atá le tarlú (IO C 165, 14.5.2019, lch. 4 agus lch. 5).
Notices of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures (OJ C 165, 14.5.2019, p. 4 and p. 5).
Ós rud é go bhféadfaí tionchar a bheith ar an trádáil níos mó ná mar ab inmhianaithe mar gheall ar charnadh beart frithdhumpála le bearta coimirce, chinn an Coimisiún cosc a chur le cur i bhfeidhm comhreathach na dleachta frithdhumpála agus na dleachta taraif-cuóta thuas don táirge atá faoi athbhreithniú ar feadh thréimhse fhorchur na dleachta coimirce.
As such cumulation of anti-dumping measures with safeguard measures may lead to an effect on trade greater than desirable, the Commission decided to prevent the concurrent application of the anti-dumping duty with the above-quota tariff duty for the product under review for the duration of the imposition of the safeguard duty.
Ag féachaint do Rialachán (AE) 2015/477 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle an 11 Márta 2015 maidir le bearta a fhéadfaidh an tAontas a dhéanamh i ndáil le héifeacht chomhcheangailte beart frithdhumpála nó frith-fhóirdheontais agus beart cosanta, agus go háirithe Airteagal 1 de,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2015/477 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on measures that the Union may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures, and in particular Article 1 thereof,
Ag féachaint do Rialachán (AE) 2015/477 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle an 11 Márta 2015 maidir le bearta a fhéadfaidh an tAontas a dhéanamh i ndáil le héifeacht chomhcheangailte beart frithdhumpála nó frith-fhóirdheontais agus beart cosanta,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2015/477 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015, on measures that the Union may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures
Sa Dara Nóta, thug an Coimisiún dá aire nár chuir na páirtithe fianaise shainiúil faoi bhráid faoin gcaoi agus faoin méid a rachadh forchur beart frithdhumpála ar an táirge faoi imscrúdú ag Meicsiceo i bhfeidhm ar a ionadaíochas agus faoin bhfáth nár ghá é a mheas a bheith iomchuí a thuilleadh mar gheall ar an toisc sin.
In the Second Note, the Commission noted that the parties did not submit specific evidence of how and to what extent the imposition of anti-dumping measures on the product under investigation by Mexico would affect its representativeness and why it would no longer have to be considered appropriate because of this circumstance.
Dá bhrí sin, dá mbeadh mar thoradh ar fhorchur beart frithdhumpála méadú foriomlán 10 %, mar shampla, ar phraghsanna SWT d’úsáideoirí a chuirfeadh formhór an mhéadaithe sin ar phraghsanna ar aghaidh chuig a gcustaiméirí, agus bheadh ina thoradh air sin, dar le EWTA, méadú bliantúil 0,05 % ar chostas tionscadail.
Thus, if the imposition of anti-dumping measures would e.g. result in an overall increase by 10 % of SWT prices for users that would pass on most of that price increase to their customers, that would, according to EWTA, result in an annual increase of a project cost by 0,05 %.
Ar an mbonn sin, mar a leagtar amach in aithrisí (127) agus (128) faoi seach, fuarthas gurb é 4,2 % an meánchorrlach foghearrtha don táirge atá faoi athbhreithniú i gcás na gcóras allmhairiúcháin go léir, agus meastar gurb é 7,2 %, faoin gcóras próiseála isteach, faoi réir aon dleachtanna, an táscaire is fearr ar na leibhéil praghsanna is dócha a bheadh ann in éagmais beart frithdhumpála.
On this basis, as set out in recitals (127) and (128) respectively, the average undercutting margin for the product under review was found to be 4,2 % for all import regimes, and 7,2 %, under the inward processing regime, the latter, subject to no duties, is considered the best indicator of the likely price levels in the absence of anti-dumping measures.
Ar an tríú dul síos, mhaígh Eviosys agus CISA go raibh saintréithe ag margadh ECCS an Aontais le duopoly i gcás ina mbeadh rogha táirgí agus cumhacht mhargála na n-úsáideoirí iartheachtacha faoi bhagairt ag forchur beart frithdhumpála agus go ndearnadh tagairt do chinneadh an Choimisiúin um chumasc atá luaite san aithris (195).
Third, Eviosys and CISA claimed that the Union ECCS market was characterised by a duopoly where the product choice and bargaining power of downstream users would be threatened by the imposition of anti-dumping measures and referred to the merger Commission decision mentioned in recital (195).
Rinne sé tagairt go háirithe d’Airteagal 11(1) den bhun-Rialachán frithdhumpála lena sonraítear nach bhfanfaidh beart frithdhumpála i bhfeidhm ach fad a mbeidh gá leis agus go rachaidh sé in éag 5 bliana tar éis a fhorchurtha.
It referred in particular to Article 11(1) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation which states that an anti-dumping measure shall only remain in force as long as it is necessary and shall expire upon 5 years from its imposition.
Mheabhraigh an Coimisiún, i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 11(2) den bhun-Rialachán, go “Rachaidh beart frithdhumpála cinntitheach in éag 5 bliana ón dáta a fhorchuirfear é nó 5 bliana ón dáta a dhéanfar cinneadh maidir leis an athbhreithniú is déanaí a cumhdóidh dumpáil agus díobháil, ach amháin má chinntear in athbhreithniú gur dhócha go leanfaí le dumpáil agus díobháil nó go gcuirfí tús leo arís mar thoradh ar dhul in éag an bhirt”.
The Commission recalled that in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation ‘A definitive anti-dumping measure shall expire 5 years from its imposition or 5 years from the date of the conclusion of the most recent review which has covered both dumping and injury, unless it is determined in a review that the expiry would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury’.
I ndáil leis sin, mheabhraigh an Coimisiún go bpléitear i Rialachán (AE) 2015/477 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle an 11 Márta 2015 maidir le bearta a fhéadfaidh an tAontas a ghlacadh i ndáil le héifeacht chomhcheangailte beart frithdhumpála nó frith-fhóirdheontais le bearta cosanta (IO L 83, 27.3.2015, lch. 11), le hidirghníomhú beart cosanta agus bearta frithdhumpála agus frithchúitimh.
In this respect, the Commission recalled that Regulation (EU) 2015/477 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on measures that the Union may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures (OJ L 83, 27.3.2015, p. 11), properly deals with the interaction of safeguard and anti-dumping and countervailing measures.
Ar bhonn na dtorthaí thuas, ba é conclúid an Choimisiúin go raibh an beart frithdhumpála arna fhorchur ar allmhairí GFF de thionscnamh Dhaon-Phoblacht na Síne agus na hÉigipte á imchéimniú maidir le hallmhairí den táirge faoi imscrúdú a bhí á choinsíniú ón Tuirc ag Turkiz Composite.
Based on the above findings, the Commission concluded that the anti-dumping duty imposed on imports of GFF originating in the PRC and Egypt were being circumvented by imports of the product under investigation consigned from Turkey by Turkiz Composite.
Ag féachaint do Rialachán (AE) 2015/477 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle an 11 Márta 2015 maidir le bearta a fhéadfaidh an tAontas Eorpach a dhéanamh i ndáil le héifeacht chomhcheangailte beart frithdhumpála nó frith-fhóirdheontais le bearta cosanta, agus go háirithe Airteagal 1 de,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2015/477 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on measures that the European Union may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures, and in particular Article 1 thereof,
Ag féachaint do Rialachán (AE) 2015/477 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle an 11 Márta 2015 maidir le bearta a fhéadfaidh an tAontas Eorpach a dhéanamh i ndáil le héifeacht chomhcheangailte beart frithdhumpála nó frith-fhóirdheontais le bearta cosanta, agus go háirithe Airteagal 1 de,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2015/477 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on measures that the European Union may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures, and in particular Article 1 thereof,
Ina theannta sin, níor thug Primex bunús leis an gcaoi a gcuireann forchur beart frithdhumpála ar allmhairí plátaí troma ó Dhaon-Phoblacht na Síne, ón Afraic Theas agus ón gCóiré Theas isteach ar oiriúnacht chostais díola, ghinearálta agus riaracháin Usiminas mar fhoinse neamhshaofa.
Moreover, Primex did not substantiate how the imposition of anti-dumping measures on imports of heavy plates from the PRC, South Africa and South Korea affected the appropriateness of SG&A of Usiminas as undistorted source.
Rialachán (AE) 2015/477 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle ar 11 Márta 2015 maidir le bearta a fhéadfaidh an tAontas a dhéanamh i ndáil le héifeacht chomhcheangailte beart frithdhumpála nó frith fhóirdheontais agus beart cosanta;
Regulation (EU) 2015/477 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on measures that the Union may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures;
I gcás easpa beart frithdhumpála, is é is dócha go n-úsáidfí an acmhainneacht bhreise chun táirgí a tháirgeadh lena n-onnmhairiú chuig an Aontas, toisc gur margadh tarraingteach é do tháirgeoirí onnmhairiúcháin na Síne, mar a shonraítear in aithrisí (156)-(163).
In the absence of anti-dumping measures, the spare capacity would likely be used to produce for export to the Union, since it is an attractive market for Chinese exporting producers as described in recitals (156)-(163).
Thagair CCCMC freisin do na barúlacha a thug sé maidir leis an dealraitheacht go n-atarlódh dumpáil, rud, de réir CCCMC, lena mbréagnófaí údair imní freisin faoi allmhairí nua a bheith ag teacht ón tSín de bharr atreorú ó mhargaí onnmhairiúcháin eile ag an tSín gur ann dóibh cheana nó de bharr dúnadh margaí eile de thoradh forchur beart frithdhumpála.
CCCMC also referred to its comments on likelihood of recurrence of dumping, which, according to CCCMC would also refute concerns about the arrival of new imports from China due to Chinese redirection from other existing export markets or from closure of other markets due to the imposition of anti-dumping measures.
[126] Fógra ón Roinn le haghaidh Chosaint an Mhargaidh Inmheánaigh de chuid an Choimisiúin Eacnamaíochta Eoráisigh (EAEU) ‘Maidir le cur i bhfeidhm beart frithdhumpála in aghaidh mealaimín de thionscnamh Dhaon-Phoblacht na Síne a allmhairítear isteach i gcrích chustaim an Aontais Eacnamaíoch Eoráisigh’.
[126] Notice of the Department for Internal Market Defence of the Eurasian Economic Commission ‘On the application of anti-dumping measures against melamine originating from the People’s Republic of China and imported into the customs territory of the Eurasian Economic Union’.
Is dócha go mbeidh tionchar forleathan ag forchur beart frithdhumpála maidir le dé-ocsaíd mhangainéise leictrealaíoch nach bhfuil teaschóireáilte ar go leor tionscal, toisc go gcuirfí bac leis ar an éileamh éagsúil ardchaighdeáin ar EMD ó thionscail ceallraí indiúscartha agus ó thionscail nua ceallraí cumhachta fuinnimh an Aontais chomh maith le tionscail eile amhail an tionscal ceimiceán, an tionscal cógaisíochta agus an tionscal criadóireachta.
The imposition of antidumping measures on not heat-treated electrolytic manganese dioxide is likely to have a wide-reaching impact on multiple industries, as it would block the diverse and high-quality demand for EMD from the Union’s disposable battery and new energy power battery industries as well as other industries such as chemical, pharmaceutical and ceramics.
Thairis sin, mhaígh na húsáideoirí agus Svepol (allmhaireoir) go mbeadh iarmhairt dhíobhálach ag forchur beart frithdhumpála ar allmhairí TPE ó Dhaon-Phoblacht na Síne ar na gnólachtaí Eorpacha sin ar roinnt bealaí, mar a leagtar amach thíos.
Furthermore, the users and Svepol (importer) claimed that imposing anti-dumping measures on PET imports from the PRC would adversely affect these European businesses in several ways, as set out below.